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INTRODUCTION
The relationship between human dignity and human rights
has become increasingly well-established in recent years. The
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union de-
clares, for example, "Human dignity is inviolable. It must be
respected and protected."' What is not so clear is the relation-
t A. Robert Noll Professor of Law, Cornell University. An earlier version of
this Essay was delivered as the keynote lecture at a conference on Property and
Human Rights held at Monash University in Melbourne, Australia, August 9-10,
2018, and at a conference on Regulatory Issues in Property Law, held at Churchill
College, Cambridge University, May 25-26, 2018. I also presented it at faculty
workshops at the Universities of Sydney and Melbourne and at the Law & the
Humanities Institute at the University of Melbourne. I am very grateful to those
faculties for inviting me and for their valuable comments. I am particularly in-
debted to Hanoch Dagan, Avihay Dorfman, Joe Singer, Tim Mulvaney, Chris
Odinet, and Eduardo Pefialver for offering insightful comments and suggestions.
1 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union tit. I, art. 1, 2012
O.J. (C 326) 6, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CEL
991
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
ship between human dignity and human flourishing. 2 For One
thing, even if we all shared the same conception of human
dignity (highly doubtful), we surely do not all share a clear
understanding of human flourishing, let alone how that con-
cept relates to dignity. Even less likely do we all share a well-
defined understanding of how property relates to the other two,
i.e., human dignity and human flourishing. My task here is to
sketch such an understanding.
I
HUMAN FLOURISHING
We all want to live flourishing lives. All but the irrational
among us wish our lives to go as well as possible for us. There
are many ways to live well-lived lives, and we have different
understandings of what it means for our lives to go maximally
well. Still, the scope of conceptions of human flourishing is not
an open set. There are limits on what it means for a person to
live a well-lived life. Human flourishing is objective rather than
simply a matter of individual subjective preferences. It is not
something that is desired but something that is desirable, and
it is desirable just because of what it is.3 Human flourishing is
ontological. Douglas Rasmussen puts it well, stating, "[Flour-
ishing] is a state of being, not a mere feeling or experience."4 It
is not a matter of feeling happy. Rather, it is a way of living life,
a way of living a life that is intrinsically good.
I said that there are many ways of living a fulfilling life.
Human flourishing is inclusive, diverse, and pluralistic. In
saying that it is pluralistic, I mean that it is not a value like
autonomy is for Kantians, i.e., a single foundational value to
which all other values may be reduced.5 It is the ultimate end
of human behavior in the sense that we all want our lives to go
well, but this is not to say that all other values may be reduced
EX:12012P/TXT&qid=1560716037231&From=EN [https://perma.cc/XH66-LM
G9].
2 Martha Nussbaum's capabilities approach, which is itself a theory of
human flourishing, has human dignity at its core. She writes that dignity "is a
vague idea that needs to be given content by placing it in a network of related
notions." MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
APPROACH 30 (2011). She specifically argues that a life worthy of human dignity
requires development of certain basic capabilities, which she enumerates. See id.
at 32-33.
3 Henry Richardson refers to ends of this sort as "final ends." See HENRY S.
RICHARDSON, PRACTICAL REASONING ABOUT FINAL ENDS (1994).
4 Douglas B. Rasmussen, Human Flourishing and the Appeal to Human Na-
ture, 16 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 1, 3 (1999).
5 See id. at 2.
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to it. To the contrary, flourishing includes many other goods,
such as health, personal security, privacy, friendship, love,
justice, and integrity, to name only a few. Each of these goods
is valuable in its own right, and they are all ingredients of the
good life. The love that I have for a person is valuable to me not
because it moves me closer to some future point when my life
will flourish. Rather, I value that love right now for its own
sake. Further, these values are incommensurate, meaning
that they cannot be weighed against each other. It is as if
someone asserted that Einstein's genius was "(morally) better
than" Mother Theresa's compassion-the balancing makes no
sense.
Human flourishing is agent-relative, that is, relative to
each person. There is no such thing as one-pattern human
flourishing. Human flourishing is always the good for a partic-
ular person. We may say it is bespoke, not off-the-rack. The
diversity of human flourishing means that the good life cannot
be defined from some neutral point of view, that of the hypo-
thetical reasonable person, but instead can only be defined by
each individual person specifically.
The agent-relativity of human flourishing might seem to
put it at odds with the objectivity of flourishing. The two are
easily confused, but the difference between them, although
subtle, is very important. The fact that something is valuable
to a specific person does not necessarily mean that its value is
just a matter of subjective preference.6 Human flourishing's
agent-relativity simply means that it always pertains to some
person. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the flour-
ishing life for any person is solely based on her desires or
preferences. Her subjective preference might be to devote her
life inflicting pain on innocent people, but despite the pleasure
she may derive from such an activity, that is not an objectively
flourishing life. The objectivity of values is such that although
each of us chooses how we think our lives will flourish, there is
a filter on what constitutes a flourishing life. As I discuss later,
although there are many ways of living an objectively flourish-
ing life, not all possible ways of living are objectively good.7
One might suppose that the fact we evaluate the goodness
of values relative to each person means that flourishing is an
egoist theory, but this is not the case. In fact, the truth is that
flourishing is often quite other-regarding. As I will discuss
6 See d. at 8.
7 See infra Part III.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104:991
later," the good life often involves taking account of others and
acting out of concern for them. This is not a matter of pure self-
sacrifice. By acting in the interests of others, we promote the
development of certain capabilities that enable our own lives go
better.
One of the important challenges facing a human flourish-
ing theory is how to measure flourishing. Economists and
others committed to welfare-maximization measure that value,
of course, in terms of resources. 9 For these welfarists, human
welfare is a matter of satisfying subjective individual prefer-
ences, revealed through exchange transactions. 1 0 In recent
years, Amartya Sen has developed an alternative approach to
measuring well-being, one that does not focus on resources.I'
Sen's insight is that flourishing is a matter of what a person is
able to do rather than what he has.1 2 That is, the well-lived life
should be measured by a person's capabilities rather than by a
person's possessions or by the satisfaction of his subjective
preferences. What a person actually does with their capabili-
8 See infra Part II.
9 See LOUIs KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNEss VERSUs WELFARE (2006).
1o See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM.
ECON. REV. 347, 347-59 (1967) (explaining that property rights develop to inter-
nalize externalities and reduce transaction costs). This is not to say that
welfarists are indifferent to the social good. Far from it; their objective is precisely
to maximize aggregate social welfare. Hence, the human flourishing theory and
welfarism, which derives from classical utilitarianism, share common ground
insofar as they both hold a basic concern with the well-being of society. The two
theories part company on two important points. The first point concerns the
standard by which one measures well-being. Welfarism measures it on the basis
of what is commonly called revealed preferences, i.e, the actual choices a person
makes between resources. According to this theory, a society is better off to the
extent that it maximizes the aggregate revealed preferences of its members. See
Robert Sugden, Welfare, Resources, and Capabilities, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE
1947, 1951 (1993). The human flourishing theory, drawing upon Sen's work,
rejects revealed preferences in favor of looking at the capabilities that are neces-
sary for a person to flourish, i.e., to live a well-lived life.
The second, and related, point of difference is that welfarism holds a concep-
tion of the common good that is subjective whereas the human flourishing the-
ory's conception is objective. As Sugden states, "Revealed preference welfarism
purports to evaluate each individual's circumstances in terms of that person's
own system of values, without even asking what those values are. An aggregation
of such independent valuations cannot be any kind of valuation at all." Id. By
contrast, the human flourishing theory contends that although there are many
ways of living a well-lived life, not every way a person may happen to choose to
spend his life is good. The common good must have an objective dimension in the
sense of filtering certain values, certain choices, or certain ways of living that are
intrinsically bad.
11 See AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES (1985); AMARIYA SEN, DEVEL-
OPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999).
12 See SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM, supra note 11, at 9.
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ties is up to him, but his life simply cannot go well unless he at
least possesses certain essential capabilities.' 3
We could endlessly debate what capabilities are essential
to be in a position to live a fulfilling life. Various philosophers,
including Sen, have their own preferred lists of capabilities. 14
But four such essential capabilities seem uncontroversial.
These are life, understood to include certain subsidiary values
such health; autonomy, understood as including the freedom
to make deliberate choices among alternative life horizons;
practical reasoning; and sociability. I shall say more about
these capabilities, especially autonomy and sociability, later,
but for now I want to suggest that all four are indispensable for
a good life.
No one can develop these capabilities by himself. The
physical process of human development makes us dependent
on others to cultivate the necessary capacities. Indeed, we are
dependent on others for our ability to function as free and
rational agents.1 5 Our dependence on others is deeper. This
form of dependence is perhaps most clear with respect to life
and its subsidiary goods. We enter the world utterly dependent
on others for our physical survival.' 6 Even upon reaching
adulthood, we continue to place at least partial physical depen-
dence (and even emotional or psychological dependence) on
others as we move through a dangerous world. Often, little
more than dumb luck separates the seemingly independent
adult from the dependent one. And, as we reach the final years
of our lives, the possibility of physical dependence once again
looms ever larger.
Life, autonomy, practical rationality, and sociability can
meaningfully exist only within a matrix of social structures and
practices. Even the most seemingly solitary and socially
13 Sen refers to what a person actually does with her capabilities as "function-
ings," which he carefully distinguishes from capabilities. See id. at 7-10. By
giving priority to capabilities, Sen means to enhance individual autonomy.
14 Compare, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE
CAPABILITIES APPROACH 78-80 (2000) (contending central human functional capa-
bilities include living to a normal human lifespan; having good bodily health;
possessing bodily integrity; using the senses, imagining, and thinking; feeling
emotions; practical reasoning; affiliating with others; living with concern for na-
ture; playing; and controlling one's environment through politics and holding
property) with SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM, supra note 11, 286-87 ("IT]he free-
dom to participate in critical evaluation and in the process of value formation is
among the most crucial freedoms of social existence.").
15 See 2 CHARLES TAYLOR, Atomism, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS: PHILOSOPHY AND
THE HUMAN SCIENCES 205 (1985).
16 See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS: WHY HUMAN BEINGS
NEED THE VIRTUES 71-74 (1999).
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threatened of these capabilities, autonomy, depends upon a
richly social, cultural, and institutional context; the free indi-
vidual must rely upon others to provide this context. From the
earliest age and well into adulthood, if not for our entire lives,
we receive from and we rely on parents, teachers and mentors,
and friends for lessons about planning and evaluation, causes
and consequences, self-restraint and discipline: these are the
raw materials from which the capability of practical reasoning
emerges. We are, in short, inevitably dependent upon commu-
nities, both chosen and unchosen, not only for our physical
survival, but also for our ability to function as free and rational
agents.
Communities, including but not limited to the state, are
the mediating vehicles through which we come to acquire the
resources we need to flourish and to become fully socialized
into the exercise of our capabilities.' 7 Even as free, rational
persons, we never cease to operate within and depend upon the
matrices of the many communities in which we find ourselves
in association. Each of our identities is inextricably connected
in some sense to others with whom we are connected as mem-
bers of multiple communities. Our identities are literally con-
stituted by the communities of which we are members. Asked
who we are, we inevitably talk about the communities where we
were born and raised, our nation, our family, where we at-
tended school, our friends, our religious communities and
clubs. Indeed, individuals and communities interpenetrate
one another so completely that they can never be fully
separated.
The communities in which we find ourselves play crucial
roles in the formation of our preferences, the extent of our
expectations, and the scope of our aspirations. The homeless
person, accustomed to receiving little more than abuse or neg-
17 This statement makes clear what has been implicit thus far, namely, that
the theory presented here is a perfectionist theory, both ethically and politically.
It is ethically perfectionist in that it holds that there are certain capabilities that
constitute perfection in human life and that it is essential to the attainment of a
flourishing life that each person develops these capabilities. The theory is politi-
cally perfectionist in that It holds that it is for the state to create the background
conditions that enable its citizens to achieve human perfection, as just defined.
See THOMAS HURKA, PERFECTIONISM 147 (1993). That the theory is perfectionist
does not mean that it is not a liberal theory. There are, of course, multiple strands
of political liberalism, and political perfectionism is entirely compatible with some,
though not all, of these strands. See generally Peter de Marneffe, Liberalism and
Perfectionism, 43 AM. J. JURIs. 99 (1998) (contending that moderate perfectionism
is compatible with the two most essential principles of liberalism: the principle of
acceptability and the principle of basic liberty). For a good brief discussion, see
MENACHEM MAUTNER, HUMAN FLOURISHING, LIBERAL THEORY, AND THE ARTS 2-4 (2018).
996 [Vol. 104:991
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lect, may come to expect little more out of life.' 8 Similarly,
although membership in certain communities can obviously be
based upon contract or voluntary agreement, the very possibil-
ity of these voluntarily associative relationships depends upon
our prior and continuing (and typically involuntary) participa-
tion in or exposure to communal institutions. These institu-
tions impart to us the information and capacities that give us
the tools needed to permit us to understand and engage in
voluntary choosing at all. 19
Precisely because capabilities are essential to flourishing
in a distinctively human way, development of one's capabilities
is an objective human good, something that we ought (insofar
as we accept these particular capabilities as intrinsically valua-
ble) to promote as a good in and of itself. As a matter of human
dignity, every person is equally entitled to flourish. This being
so, every person must be equally entitled to those things essen-
tial for human flourishing, i.e., the capabilities that are the
foundation of flourishing and the material resources required
to nurture those capabilities. In the absence of these capabili-
ties and supporting resources, recognition of the entitlement to
flourish is simply an empty gesture. But not every society will
be equally conducive to human flourishing. The cultivation of
the capabilities necessary for flourishing depends upon social
matrices, and the condition of those matrices varies among
societies, sometimes quite widely. A society that fosters those
capabilities that are necessary for human flourishing is morally
better than one that is either indifferent or (even worse) hostile
to their manifestation.
II
HUMAN DIGNITY
Human dignity has been a controversial topic in recent
years. Not only is there no settled meaning of dignity, some
scholars have even argued that the concept is unnecessary,
indeed absurd. 20 This is not the proper occasion for respond-
ing to the dignity-doubters nor for developing a rigorous philo-
18 See SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES, supra note 11, at 21 ("A person who
is ill-fed, undernourished, unsheltered and ill can still be high up in the scale of
happiness or desire-fulfilment if he or she has learned to have 'realistic' desires
and to take pleasure in small mercies.").
19 See TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, supra note 15, at 196-98.
20 See, e.g., Ruth Macklin, Editorial, Dignity Is a Useless Concept, 327 BRIT.
MED. J. 1419, 1419 (2003) (arguing that appeals to dignity are "either vague
restatements of other, more precise, notions or mere slogans that add nothing to
an understanding" of dignity and should be eliminated); Stephen Pinker, The
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sophical argument in support of any particular conception of
dignity. But I do need to sketch a bit of background regarding
the main positions and to state my conception of human
dignity.
One familiar distinction in the philosophical literature on
dignity is between honor and worth conceptions of dignity. 2 1
Honor is a matter of social position or rank and contingent,
whereas worth, the conception usually associated with Kant, is
intrinsic and universally attributed to all human beings.22
Honor is the older of the two conceptions and, as Meir Dan-
Cohen points out, it is often claimed that "the ascendance of
dignity-talk marks a trajectory from honor to worth."23 As I
shall discuss later, however, Jeremy Waldron has offered an-
other conception, one that takes us back to the earlier tradition
of rank but with a major twist.2 4 In addition to the two concep-
tions I have identified, I should note that there are two correla-
tive usages of dignity. The first usage is dignity as behavior.
This is the idea that dignity consists in behavior that is digni-
fied, more specifically, "the commitment and capacity to en-
dure suffering in the struggle to meet the demands of duty." 25
The second usage draws from Kant in associating dignity with
respect. 2 6 This is not respect for rank or privilege but respect
for a person's humanity. This conception understands that
dignity lies in how we regard others and how we express that
attitude. We treat others with dignity when we treat them with
respect.2 7 I shall come back to these usages later, but for now I
want to focus attention on the two dominant threads of dignity-
talk in political and legal literature: the rank and worth
conceptions. 2 8
Stupidity of Dignity, NEW REPUBLIC, May 28, 2008, at 28 (arguing that dignity as a
concept in bioethics is relative, fungible, and potentially harmful).
21 See JEREMY WALDRON, DIGNITY, RANK, & RIGHTS 27 (Meir Dan-Cohen ed.,
2012); Meir Dan-Cohen, Introduction to id. at 3-4.
22 See WALDRON, supra note 21, at 4, 6.
23 Id.
24 See id. at 33-70; infra note 53 and accompanying text.
25 MICHAEL ROSEN, DIGNITY: ITS HISTORY AND MEANING 36 (2012).
26 In the Groundwork, Kant connected dignity with respect, not in the sense
that we respect traffic laws (respect-as-obedience) but in the sense of the attitude
that we owe to a person purely on the basis of her humanity. Kant refers to
dignity as "unconditional, incomparable worth, for which the word respect alone
makes a befitting expression of the estimation a rational being is to give of it."
IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 47-48 (Mary Gregor &
Jens Timmermann eds., rev. ed. 2012). For an illuminating discussion on this,
see ROSEN, supra note 25, at 26-27, 143-45.
27 See KANT, supra note 26, at 61-62.
28 Leslie Meltzer Henry has identified five conceptions of dignity that emerge
from U.S. Supreme Court case law. She terms these "institutional status as
998 [Vol. 104:991
2019] PROPERTY, DIGNITY, AND HUMAN FLOURISHING 999
Historically, rank came first, and it comes to us today with
considerable baggage. Michael Rosen observes that dignity
"originated as a concept that denoted high social status and
the honors and respectful treatment that are due to someone
who occupied that position." 2 9 Rank referenced a social hierar-
chy in which, save the person at the top, everyone was always
subordinated to someone else.
The association of dignity with rank began to change in the
eighteenth century. The stock story is that after the French
and American Revolutions dignity became incompatible with
rank and social hierarchy, ushering in the egalitarian Kantian
conception of dignity as human worth. James Whitman has
recently provided a different, more nuanced account.3 0 He ar-
gues that after 1750, continental Europe leveled up, extending
formerly high-status treatment to all sectors of the population.
In the United States, the process was one of leveling-down,
extending rights and privileges to persons who formerly had
been slaves.
I want to suggest that, ironically enough, a fruitful way of
understanding dignity emerges from its harshest contemporary
critics. Dignity-deriders like Stephen Pinker believe that dig-
nity is completely unnecessary because autonomy does all the
real work that dignity might possibly do.3 1 Pinker is wrong, I
believe, that autonomy makes dignity redundant, but he is
right in seeing a close relationship between the two. The rea-
son why autonomy does not render dignity unnecessary is that
autonomy is a human capability and dignity is not. Dignity is
neither a description nor an honorific. It is not bestowed on us,
so it requires no justification or criterion. Rather, dignity is a
human characteristic, and a special kind of characteristic at
that. It is an existential characteristic, existential in the sense
that a person possesses it purely because of her or his exis-
tence. As such, it is an intrinsic characteristic, intrinsic to
every human being. To be human is to have dignity.32 A per-
dignity," "equality as dignity," "liberty as dignity," "personal integrity as dignity,"
and "collective virtue as dignity." Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dig-
nity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 169 (2011).
29 ROSEN, supra note 25, at 11.
30 See James Q. Whitman, 'Hunan Dignity' in Europe and the United States:
The Social Foundations, in EURoPEAN AND US CONSITUTIONALISM 108-24 (Georg
Nolte ed., 2005).
31 See Pinker, supra note 20.
32 This is not to deny the possibility that non-human species may intrinsi-
cally have dignity as well. For present purposes I will put that question aside.
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son possesses dignity from the moment of birth until death.33
Dignity is indefeasible; a person cannot forfeit her or his dignity
regardless of any act she or he commits. Even Hitler had
dignity.
Autonomy is different. We need to pause on autonomy
because it is an ambiguous and contested term.34 The account
that I shall offer differs importantly from that given by classical
liberals and those who have uncritically accepted that tradi-
tional way of understanding the term. To classical liberals,
personal autonomy connotes liberty and individualism.35
These theorists consider that the justification of liberalism it-
self is grounded on the idea of personal autonomy and further
that personal autonomy just means that a person is self-di-
rected, i.e., is a person "whose deliberations about what he
should do normally determine his own actions."3 6
The alternative account of autonomy offered here is much
thicker than this minimalist account. It considers personal
autonomy as self-authorship as distinguished from self-direc-
tion. The minimal, self-directed account understands the au-
tonomous person as one who sees her actions as following from
her own deliberations. Those deliberations, however, may be
based on unreflective considerations, such as superstition.3 7
Autonomy as self-authorship, by contrast, understands delib-
eration as involving self-conscious choice about how one
wishes to live one's life.38 Choice may be self-conscious but not
based on deliberation. One may self-consciously make choices
33 Here again, for the time being, I avoid important and difficult moral ques-
tions, notably when whether dignity obtains prior to birth, i.e., whether a fetus
has dignity and whether a corpse Is entitled to respect by virtue of human dignity.
Regarding the former question, the Catholic Church takes the position that the
dignity of the human being fully exists from the moment of conception. See
ROSEN, supra note 25, at 93-99. On the latter question, the discussion in id. at
127-160, is highly illuminating.
34 See BEN COLBURN, AUTONOMY AND LIBERALISM 2, 4 (2010).
35 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SKEPTIcISM AND FREEDOM: A MODERN CASE FOR
CLASSICAL LIBERALISM (2003) (discussing key principles of classical liberalism: re-
spect for autonomy of individual, strong system of private property rights, volun-
tary exchange of labor and possessions, and prohibitions against force or fraud);
Gerald F. Gaus, The Place of Autonomy within Liberalism, in AUTONOMY AND THE
CHALLENGES TO LIBERALISM: NEW ESSAYS 272 (John Christman & Joel Anderson
eds., 2005) (discussing the place of autonomy within liberalism, understood as a
public morality).
36 Gaus, The Place of Autonomy within Liberalism, supra note 35, at 293.
37 See id. at 295.
38 See STEVEN WALL, LIBERALISM, PERFECTIONISM AND RESTRAINT 203 (1998).
What I have in mind here is closely related to what Joe Singer calls "considered
judgment." See Joseph William Singer, Normative Methods for Lawyers, 56 UCLA
L. REV. 899, 921, 935, 944 (2009).
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based on traditions that one has inherited, for example, or on
the practices of groups of which one is a member.
On this thicker view, personal autonomy means more than
just freedom from state interference or freedom from others
dictating what ends a person should pursue. Autonomy to
classical liberals is simply a constraint on the conduct of
others.39 Once understood as self-authorship, i.e., the ability
to deliberate about and to make one's own life, personal auton-
omy comes into view as a capability. This capacity to deliberate
includes the ability to understand that a person cannot choose
her values without appreciating that she is not alone and that
her values must be compatible with the fact that she needs
other people and they need her. From this perspective, then,
whereas dignity is an innate human characteristic, autonomy
comes into view as a capability, developed rather than
inherited.
No one is born into this world as a fully autonomous moral
agent. Rather, one develops as such an autonomous agent
over time and does so with the help of the multiple communi-
ties to which one belongs, ranging from the family to school to
friends. What it means to be a fully autonomous moral agent is
to have the capability of imagining different possible ways of
constructing one's life and choosing among them. It is the
capacity to conceive alternatives and make decisions about
how to live one's life and to construct a life deliberately as one
passes through it. Most of us can decide whether to have this
or that for dinner. But do we regard our way of living as the
only way of life, a mode of thought so narrow that, to us, any
other way of living is completely out of the question? 40 Can we
reflect on where our lives are now and the direction in which we
wish our lives to go in the future? Further, are we, for reasons
having to do with fear of whatever or whoever is unfamiliar to
us, incapable of understanding someone else's point of view or
putting ourselves in their place?4 1 This is autonomy in a spe-
cific sense, autonomy as self-authorship, self-determination, 4 2
and self-reflection.
39 See ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT'S LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOS-
OPHY 14, 34, 45 (2009).
40 See TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, supra note 15, at 187, 204.
41 See id.
42 Joe Singer points out that self-determination requires having the chance to
act with others to collectively pass laws that set the rules for social interaction in a
way compatible with equal dignity. See Joseph William Singer, Democratic Prop-
erty: Things We Should Not Have to Bargain For, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PRIVATE
LAw THEORIES (Hanoch Dagan & Benjamin Zipursky eds. (forthcoming 2020)).
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Autonomy as self-authorship is closely related to another
capability I previously noted as necessary for human flourish-
ing, namely, sociability. The relationship between autonomy
and sociability is such that sociability helps to define what
autonomy is. Sociability involves concern for other people and
getting along with them. A well-socialized person attempts to
place himself in the other person's position to gain understand-
ing of that person's perspective. The opposite of sociability is
hatred. A person who is completely devoid of sociability takes
difference to such a length that, for such a person, others lose
their humanity. They become aliens, objects, or still worse,
vermin. This process of dehumanization reaches its apogee in
ideologies such as that of the National Socialist German Work-
ers Party (NSDAP, the "Nazis"). Sadly, and frustratingly, we
continue to see this around the world today.
Sociability is really just one aspect of this more profound
understanding of autonomy.4 3 A conception of autonomy that
is exclusively self-regarding is seriously incomplete. Freedom
must be other-regarding as well. To be a free person, I must
regard others as concrete human beings, or else I will be a
prisoner of my own ignorance, prejudices, and blindness. If I
am to become someone who is able to choose among values
and to make considered judgments about other people, I must
develop a capacity for understanding other people. This is
what sociability involves. Sociability allows a person to see
others, including those who seem radically different from one-
self, on their own terms. This means regarding them as con-
crete persons with shared humanity with oneself. A fully free
person has developed the capability for such perception.
Because humans are social animals, 4 4 we need others. Yet
life within a community can be autonomy-decreasing, even au-
tonomy-annihilating. There is a dark side to community.4 5 So-
ciability is distinguishable from community or communal life.
Rather, it refers to the capacities to view others as actual, con-
crete persons and to get along with them, and life within one's
communities ideally nurtures such capacities. But the ability
of communities themselves to perform this sociability-nurtur-
43 In this respect my conception of autonomy fuses personal autonomy and
moral autonomy. For a clear discussion of the distinction, see Jeremy Waldron,
Moral Autonomy and Personal Autonomy, in AUTONOMY AND THE CHALLENGES TO
LIBERALISM: NEW ESSAYS, supra note 35, at 307.
44 See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHics bk. IX, at 176-79 (Roger Crisp ed., 2d
rev. ed. 2014) (c. 384 B.C.E.).
45 See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, PROPERTY AND HUMAN FLOURISHING 77-80, 100
(2018).
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ing function varies, and we must acknowledge that even some
seemingly benign categories of communities, such as families,
can subvert the development of the other-regarding outlook
that is essential to robust sociability. The value of communi-
ties and of society more broadly, then, is not a freestanding one
but rather instrumental to autonomy and flourishing.
Earlier I described dignity as an innate human characteris-
tic, an existential characteristic. This means that every person
is born with dignity. By contrast, no one is born with auton-
omy. Rather, each person has the potential to develop as an
autonomous agent. Here is both the distinction and connec-
tion between dignity and autonomy. Dignity consists in the
inherent bare potential to develop the thick kind of autonomy I
have described.4 6 It is not autonomy itself; rather, it is unreal-
ized autonomy. One can have dignity and be autonomous or
have both dignity and autonomy, but one cannot lack dignity
yet have autonomy. Dignity consists in the potential to develop
as a fully autonomous person. Every person has this potential
based solely on the fact of her existence as a human being, and
as such, a person with dignity. For any given person, however,
this potential may or may not be realized. This is the reason
why autonomy is a capability, rather than an objectively valua-
ble pattern of existence, or what Amartya Sen calls "function-
ing."4 7 Autonomy is not inherent in humans, then. It must be
developed and cultivated, and this cultivation can occur only
with the help of others. The cultivation of autonomy is as much
a mental, emotional, and psychological process as it is a physi-
cal matter. People who are incarcerated for a time may never-
theless be or become autonomous, and, conversely, persons
suffering from no physical constraints may nevertheless never
develop into fully autonomous agents.48 Sadly, some people
46 My conception of dignity bears some resemblance to that developed in
James Griffin's book, On Humanr Rights. There are important differences between
Griffin's conception of dignity and mine, however. Griffin does not treat dignity as
an intrinsic moral status of human being, whereas I consider it as an existential
characteristic. Second, his conception of freedom and my understanding of au-
tonomy are quite different. He adopts a conventional understanding of freedom
whereas my conception of autonomy is social and reciprocal. See JAMES GRIFFIN,
ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2008).
47 See SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES, supra note 11, at 10-11.
48 The criterion of the capacity to deliberate might appear to have the conse-
quence that certain categories of persons and persons of certain ages cannot be
autonomous. So, children, at least those of a young age, are not capable of
deliberation. At the opposite end of life's spectrum, some, but not all, elderly
persons, such as those suffering from dementia, also lack the capability of ra-
tional deliberation. The same is true for certain persons who are mentally im-
paired. In such cases, the disabled persons are represented by adults who are
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have been raised in environments that stultify any potential for
psychological and moral growth, blocking out all perspectives
other than one narrow view and freezing any potential for
growth. Free to choose is a meaningless claptrap unless one
has the ability to see available options for living and to perceive
that there are multiple understandings of the good. Choice is a
matter of deliberation, and we cannot deliberate unless we are
able to see and to understand the range of options.
No one can come to perceive or to understand the range of
possibilities alone. Humans are not self-sufficient. We depend
on others to help us develop the abilities to perceive and to
deliberate that constitute autonomy. For many, perhaps most,
of us, this process of development begins with the family, our
parents, siblings, and grandparents. For others, initial devel-
opment of autonomy begins at school, with cultivation coming
from teachers, counselors, even fellow students. Autonomy
continues to develop as we pass through more advanced stages
of our lives, with help coming from co-workers, friends, neigh-
bors, and others. There is nothing inevitable about this pro-
cess, however. Not everyone is fortunate enough to be
surrounded by family, teachers, and friends who themselves
are autonomous and who are in a position to facilitate develop-
ment of the capabilities necessary for a richly autonomous life.
Some people are unfree for periods or even the entirety of their
lives.
Dignity and autonomy, then, are intimately related, but
they are not identical. Dignity is unrealized autonomy. Dignity
is equal among all human beings merely by virtue of their
humanity. No one has more dignity than others. Autonomy is
different. Autonomy is acquired, not inherited. No one is au-
tonomous from birth. Instead, everyone has the potential to
become autonomous. So, unlike autonomy, we are all born as
dignity-bearing creatures, and it is up to others, family, teach-
ers, friends, and so on, whether our potential for autonomy
develops. Because of the different background condition in
which we are nurtured, not everyone develops this potential
equally. Unlike dignity, then, some persons are more autono-
mous than others.
The potential to develop as autonomous agents imparts to
humans, every human, a certain status, a singular status that
demands respect. Dignity in this sense, as the potential for
autonomy, creates for every person an entitlement to respect,
capable of deliberation and who can act of their behalf. So, even these persons
can be said to be autonomous, although in an indirect, representative way.
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specifically, an entitlement to respect the potential for develop-
ing the capability of autonomy. Every person is entitled to
develop as a fully autonomous human being. Regardless of
how fully or little developed their capacity of autonomy is at
any point, everyone is equally entitled to respect. This equal
right to respect is essential because it is instrumental to each
person's ability to continue to develop as an autonomous
agent.
Dignity, then, is both a potential for autonomy and a right
to develop that potential. This means that others in our lives
have obligations to respect that entitlement by respecting our
potential for autonomy. Most immediately, those obligations
are negative, that is, they are obligations of non-interference.
But there may also be positive obligations as well. Negatively,
other persons in our lives are obligated not to act in ways that
block or impede our opportunities for acquiring the capacities
of self-authorship, self-determination, and self-reflection. Par-
ents, teachers, or others who frustrate the development of our
ability to conceive alternatives and make decisions about how
to live our lives and to construct our lives in a deliberate fash-
ion breach their obligation to respect our dignity. Likewise,
insofar as they render us incapable of understanding some-
one's else's point of view or putting ourselves in their place,
persons who have responsibilities for our moral formation may
fail to meet their obligations to us. In the United States, news
accounts reported that a California married couple with thir-
teen children were discovered to have kept their children, rang-
ing in ages from two to twenty-nine, to their beds amid foul
surroundings in their home.4 9 The children were discovered by
police malnourished and unwashed. They had never attended
school and had no contact with the outside world.50 This is
obviously an egregious and unusual example of failure to re-
spect dignity, but it is a useful example by illustrating so vividly
how persons with great responsibility may breach their obliga-
tion by blocking the capacity to develop autonomy.
There may be positive obligations as well. I shall have more
to say later about positive obligations,5 1 but for now I need to
point out that fulfilling our obligation to respect another per-
49 See Marwa Eltagouri, Before Police Rescued Their 13 Children, California
Couple Had a History of Strange Behavior, Family and Neighbors Say, CHICAGO
TRIB. (Jan. 22, 2018, 10:20 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nation
world/ct-california-children-shackled-20180122-story.html [https://perma.cc/
P4UT-EGUE].
50 See id.
51 See infra Part IV.
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son's dignity may require positive action on our part, not sim-
ply non-interference. In fact, the case of David and Louise
Turpin, the California couple who abused their thirteen chil-
dren, illustrates the fact that non-interference and affirmative
action are often inseparable. Parents cannot meet their obliga-
tion to respect their children's dignity by simply standing aside;
they must act. Cultivation of autonomy begins at birth and
continues through childhood. The persons primarily responsi-
ble for assuring that children receive what autonomy develop-
ment requires are parents, and this parental responsibility
requires them to take many important, indeed crucial, affirma-
tive actions to provide what children need to develop as fully
autonomous agents. Certainly, these actions include providing
a loving and safe home environment, but the parental obliga-
tion of respect for their children's dignity goes much deeper. It
requires that they "teach their children well," as the song
goes. 52 Concretely, that means teaching about multiple ways
of living a life and how to choose wisely among the available
options. It includes teaching about the fact that more than one
value or set of values exists and that reasonable people can and
do disagree about different values. Teaching wisely about val-
ues is not limited to exposing children to a multiplicity of val-
ues, but is going beyond to the matter of choosing among these
values and then possibly adjusting these choices through one's
life. Respecting dignity also means teaching to respect others,
especially persons whose personal characteristics, back-
ground, or value commitments are different from one's own.
An essential aspect of teaching respect for others is teaching
how to resolve differences, even profound differences, of opin-
ion or value in a peaceful and considered way. Parents respect
their children's dignity by teaching them how to respect the
dignity of others, especially persons whose viewpoints seem so
alien to them. Every person, without exception, is endowed
with dignity, and dignity demands respect from others, from
everyone.
This conception of dignity, dignity as the potential for au-
tonomy, overlaps with both the status and worth conceptions.
From the point of view of dignity-as-potential, status and worth
are really just opposite sides of the same coin. Along with the
status understanding of dignity, this conception shares the
view that a person has dignity purely because of who she is,
52 See CROSBY, STILLS, NASH & YOUNG, Teach Your Children, on D&JA VU (Atlan-
tic 1970); Teach Your Children, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Teach
YourChildren [https://perma.cc/NT2C-L9RR].
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i.e., her status as a human being. Yet it differs from rank, with
which status is often seen as a synonym. Rank is a hierarchi-
cal understanding of dignity. It is contingent and limited, con-
tingent in the sense that it is dependent upon certain
conditions being met. Rank is limited in the sense that it is
subject to ordinal placement.53
Existential dignity, by contrast, is universal and absolute.
Because it is intrinsic to persons by virtue of their sheer hu-
manity, the existential conception overlaps with the Kantian
worth or value view of dignity. Like worth, there is an equality
dimension to dignity-as-potential that rank by its very nature
lacks.5 4 But it carries none of the metaphysical baggage of
Kant's scheme. Moreover, by rooting dignity in the fact of
human existence, it avoids the unfortunate echoes of com-
modification that appeals to human worth or value create.
Even if we repudiated the connection to commodification as
avoidable, there is still the question whether dignity is the
proper word to capture the substance of the worth idea. Jer-
emy Waldron argues that "Wzirde, in the sense of the [relevant]
passage in Kant's Groundwork, expresses a type of value or a
fact about value. 'Dignity,' by contrast, conveys the idea of a
type of status that a person may have."5 5 Recalling that I have
distinguished status and rank, identifying the former more
closely with the sort of inherited characteristic that I have in
mind, I think Waldron is right about this. Dignity expresses an
idea that worth does not adequately convey. Worth is the
wrong term because it does not capture the idea of dignity as
the potential to develop thick autonomy.
At the same time, status fails to capture the full import of
dignity. There is an expressive aspect of dignity that status
misses.5 6 We express our dignity by how we lead our lives.
Leading a life as a robustly autonomous person expresses our
dignity. As robustly autonomous humans, we discern availa-
ble possible choices for our actions and the values our actions
53 Jeremy Waldron suggests a conception of dignity that universalizes rank,
as Pico della Mirandola did before him. This egalitarian move removes the
problems of subordination that I have identified with rank and that are usually
associated with the term, but, in doing so, it conflates rank with status, a move
that, for reasons I have already given, I resist. See WALDRON, supra note 21, at
33-90; GIovANNI PICO DELIA MIRANDOLA, ORATION ON THE DIGNITY OF MAN 5 (Sebastian
Michael ed., Charles Glenn Wallis trans., Optimist Books 2018) (1496).
54 Cf. Henry, supra note 28, at 207 n. 192 (discussing institutional status as
dignity and its inegalitarian nature).
55 WALDRON, supra note 21, at 24.
56 See John Kleinig & Nicholas G. Evans, Human Flourishing, Human Dignity,
and Human Rights, 32 LAw & PHIL. 539, 554 (2013).
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express, and we deliberate about those possible choices. In
doing so, we construct for ourselves a life that expresses our
understandings of ourselves and who we wish to become. Such
a process of self-construction respects our own dignity. Yet it
is possible for us to demean our own dignity (demean, although
not forfeit, because dignity is indefeasible). Some people live
lives born of impulse or whim. Others may have had exper-
iences that lead them to close their open-minded deliberative
processes, shutting out all viewpoints except one narrow set of
values. When people like this act in these non-deliberative,
unchosen ways they demean their own dignity because they
stifle their own potential for autonomy.
III
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HUMAN DIGNITY
AND HUMAN FLOURISHING
How, then, do human dignity and human flourishing relate
to each other? The relationship is, in short, important, but it is
contingent and uncertain. To see why, let us return to the
meaning and requisites of flourishing.
There are many ways of living a well-lived life, I have said,
but not all ways of living lead to human flourishing. James is a
highly paid professional hit man. He murders for hire, and he
is entirely indifferent about the identities of his targets, who
number in the hundreds. When he is not off murdering, he
lives a life of luxury, enjoying meals at five-star restaurants,
fine wines, wearing tailored clothes, driving an expensive
sports car. James is also devoid of moral values. He respects
no one's life. He trusts no one and has no friends. He will do
literally anything to get what he wants. James may live in
luxury, but he does not live a flourishing life. I have stressed
the social character of humans. Our sociality means that we
flourish in a social context, not alone. Because we can flourish
only within such a social environment, we must internalize and
express certain values that enable our sociality and, poten-
tially, our flourishing. A person like James who has neither
internalized nor expresses those values may live in luxury, but
he does not live an objectively well-lived life.
Among the values that are necessary for anyone's ability to
lead a flourishing life is respect for others, specifically, respect
for others' autonomy. Dignity, as the potential for autonomy,
demands respect. Being an agent with dignity is one thing;
having that dignity respected is another. I have argued that
every person has an entitlement to respect, specifically, an en-
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titlement to respect the potential for developing the capability
of autonomy. This means, as I have stressed, that other per-
sons have obligations to respect that entitlement by respecting
our potential for dignity. No one can lead a flourishing life
without the respect of others for our dignity, understood as our
potential for developing as autonomous persons. This does not
require that everyone with whom we come into contact respect
our dignity, but it does mean that for each of us to live well we
must experience a minimal level of respect. That level varies
according to our relationships. We expect a fairly high level of
respect from our immediate family and friends. At work, we
expect respect from co-workers, including our superiors. But it
is reasonable to expect a certain kind of respect even from
complete strangers. Even strangers are morally obligated not
to interfere intentionally, directly or indirectly, with our poten-
tial to develop as autonomous persons. This is the heart of the
offense in all forms of subordination, including racism, sexism,
homophobia, and similar social practices. They profoundly
disrespect the victim, including complete strangers, by radi-
cally denying the victim's autonomy. Acts such as racist com-
ments, sexual discrimination and harassment, and
homophobic bullying create environments of closed spaces,
threatening to narrow the range of possible options available to
the victim, implicitly denying the victim's very humanity. Such
behavior fundamentally frustrates human flourishing. At a
minimum, flourishing depends upon recognition of a person's
humanity.
Not only does flourishing require respect from others, it
also requires respect for others' dignity. Respect for others'
dignity acts as an objective filter on which ways of living consti-
tute flourishing. This is why the life that James, the hit man,
lives, however much it may reflect his preferences, cannot be a
well-lived life. James disrespected every one of his victims sim-
ply by murdering them. The murders may have been entirely
anonymous and without any personal contact or communica-
tion between murderer and victim. Yet what more direct and
egregious form of disrespect for another person's dignity exists
than to murder that person in cold blood? James has disre-
spected each and every one of his victims in the gravest possi-
ble way. In doing so, he has disrespected his own dignity. If I
respect my own dignity I will act in ways designed to realize my
potential to develop as a fully autonomous moral agent. Part of
what autonomy involves is understanding someone else's point
of view or putting oneself in their place. It involves taking the
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other person's humanity seriously. Murdering another person
for money represents repudiation of that person's concrete hu-
manity. The victim is a "mark," an object rather than an indi-
vidual with a distinctive personality.
Just as James disrespects his dignity by taking out hits on
innocent victims, so, too, do people denigrate their dignity
when they engage in racist, sexist, or homophobic behavior.
Imagine a powerful Hollywood movie producer who widely ha-
rasses women sexually, demanding that they perform sexual
acts on him in return for support for their careers. Such a man
fails to see these women, or likely any woman, as a concrete
human being. Much like James the hit man, he does not per-
ceive his victims as unique individuals who have their own
talents and needs and who are just as entitled to flourish as he
is. He is entirely indifferent to their flourishing and is quite
prepared to deny them their needs for developing as autono-
mous human beings. The same is true of white people who
practice racial discrimination against people of color, denying
them opportunities available to white people. And it is true of
straight people who utter homophobic epithets at gay, lesbian,
or transgender individuals.
Patricia Williams has spoken of such behavior as "spirit-
murder," murdering the spirits of victims of racial and other
forms of discrimination.5 7 It is that, but it is also spirit-killing
of the one who engages in such behavior. The Hollywood movie
producer and the white nationalist both undermine their own
humanity by obliterating the humanity of their victims. They
deprive themselves of the opportunities to develop their capaci-
ties to discern commonness beyond difference, to perceive, that
is, what it is in others that makes those persons just like them,
despite differences of race, gender, sexual orientation, or other.
In doing so, they undermine their own autonomy and disre-
spect their own dignity.
There is an expressive aspect to respecting one's own dig-
nity, and it connects the dignity as potential for autonomy
conception with a meaning sometimes ascribed to dignity,
something like noble bearing. In one meaning provided by the
Oxford English Dictionary,5 8 dignity connotes "befitting eleva-
tion of aspect, manner, or style; . . . stateliness, gravity." On
this view a dignified person is someone with a particular de-
57 See Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of
Fingerpointing as the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAvIl L. REV. 127 (1987).
58 See wALDRON, supra note 21, at 21 (quoting Dignity, OxFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY).
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portment and bearing, a person possessed with self-control.
There is a certain gravitas to such a person such that others
know simply from her stature and self-possession that she is a
person to take seriously.5 9
Nelson Mandela was a person who embodied the sort of
dignified deportment I am describing.60 Even when he was
imprisoned on Robbin Island, he exuded seriousness of pur-
pose and self-possession. In Mandela's case, dignity as bearing
matched moral dignity, but this is not always the case. Vladi-
mir Putin, for example, carries himself with apparent dignity,
but I doubt that many of us would wish to hold him up as a
model of moral dignity. Although the two men shared a certain
kind of physical stature, one expressed dignity while the other
does not. Mandela's entire life was expressive of a deep respect
for others, including his foes. He deliberated about their point
of view, attempting to understand it even as he abhorred it.6 1
In doing so, he was able to see his adversaries as human beings
with shared characteristics that facilitated his ability to negoti-
ate with them. Putin, on the other hand, seems to express
none of these traits. Far from respecting his political oppo-
nents, he has them assassinated. 62 His relationships with
others in the public realm express a deep cynicism and dis-
trust. Publicly, he possesses a certain kind of self-control, but
it not the sort born of honesty or truth. He is a man who invites
distrust. He may demand respect, but it is not respect for his
virtues. Rather, it is the kind of respect arising out of distrust
and even fear.
Nelson Mandela's life shed light on why dignity is indefeasi-
ble despite what happens to a person over the course of his life.
Mandela retained his dignity in the face of the adversity and
disrespect he endured while imprisoned on Robbin Island. He
never internalized that disrespect by giving in to it. But imag-
59 In Latin, dignLtas and gravitas are related terms. Cicero used them both to
describe speech that was weighty and majestic. See ROSEN, supra note 25, at
12-13.
60 Mother Teresa, despite her small size and somewhat hunched posture, also
had dignified bearing. Cf. Mother Teresa-Biographical, NOBEL PRIZE, https://
www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1979/teresa/biographical/ Ihttps://perma
.cc/X93K-TKZU] (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
61 See Tom Lodge, Nelson Mandela Assessing the Icon, OPENDEMOCRACY (July
18, 2008), https://www.opendemocracy.net/article/democracy-power/afica/
nelson-mandela-at-90 [https://perma.cc/5LFS-QRTX).
62 See Calder Walton, Russia Has a Long History of Eliminating 'Enemies of
the State,'WASH. POST (Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
monkey-cage/wp/2018/03/13/russia-has-a-long-history-of-eliminating-ene
mies-of-the-state/?noredirect=on&utmterm=.7dlel2052dac {https://perma
.cc/57D5-NGTK].
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ine a different person. Imagine a man or a woman living on the
streets, ignored and shunned by others, dumped on by life so
many times that she finally has come to believe the implicit
narrative she reads in her life: she is unworthy. She internal-
izes the loss of others' respect to the point that she believes
them-she no longer respects herself. Still, despite the loss of
self-respect, she has retained her dignity. She is a human
being with autonomy, and that is the core of dignity. This is the
difference between dignity and self-respect: Dignity, as an exis-
tential characteristic, is indefeasible, and self-respect is not.
This expressive aspect applies equally to respect for other
people's dignity as well as respect for one's own dignity. The
manner in which we exhibit our respect for another person is
highly expressive. We do so in our speech, our demeanor, our
actions, and all the ways in which we interact with that person
and with others about that person. Even if the person is a total
stranger, perhaps someone whose political views we abhor and
completely reject, we can express our respect for that person.
Suppose I attend a political rally demonstrating against certain
political positions, and supporters of those positions hold a
counter-rally. I do not respect their views or their values, but I
respect them as persons. I respect their humanity and do not
demonize them. I do not engage in pushing or shoving with
them and do not strike them except in self-defense. The line is
between respect for a person's views and the person himself,
and that line is crucial. In the more quotidian affairs of life, the
same is true. I may not approve of another person's way of
driving, but I express respect for him as a person by refraining
from gesturing at him.
These two expressive aspects of respect for human dignity
are really not separate from each other, for expressing respect
for another person's dignity draws respect from others, includ-
ing opponents, for one's dignity. The person who attends the
political rally and is able to stand above the melee that ensues
from the counter-rally stands out as a person of great dignity
when she engages constructively with her political opponents,
and she is noticed and respected for her behavior. People who
show respect are people who are themselves respected.
Nelson Mandela's life illustrates how human dignity con-
tributes to a flourishing life. 6 3 Having our dignity respected
and respecting the dignity of others are both necessary for an
objectively flourishing life. Clearly, Mandela respected others'
63 See Kleinig & Evans, supra note 56, at 558.
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dignity, and even while he was in prison he commanded the
respect of many people not only in South Africa but around the
world.64 Respect for one's own dignity and respect for the dig-
nity of our fellows are both necessary conditions for flourish-
ing, but they are not sufficient conditions. Certain other
capabilities are also necessary. In Mandela's case, at least fol-
lowing his release from years of harsh imprisonment on Robbin
Island, he apparently acquired those capabilities that are es-
sential to leading a well-lived life, such as health, education,
personal security, and so on. Just as respect for dignity is a
necessary but not a sufficient condition for a flourishing life, so
also are those capabilities. Nelson Mandela's life went better
for him because he had profound respect for human dignity. It
is difficult to imagine how his life would gone had he left Robbin
Island an embittered man respecting no one. However else his
life may have gone, it is profoundly difficult to imagine that it
would have flourished.
Consider in this regard James the hit man. He seemingly
has acquired all those capabilities necessary for a flourishing
life, but I insist that his is not a flourishing life. He has not
developed the capability of respecting others. Even if he com-
mands the respect of others, an assumption that is dubious-
there is a difference between fear and respect: fear lacks re-
spect for other people's dignity-his life objectively is impover-
ished. Subjectively, he may enjoy the so-called better things in
life, satisfying his preferences, but his is not a morally satisfy-
ing way of living. Most of us would not wish to trade places
with James. Aside from the non-trivial risk he assumes, he
may be a rather socially-isolated person, but even if not, he
probably does not enjoy the respect of his companions. Some-
thing about his presence will strike a bit of fear in others, and
as I have indicated, fear is not the same as respect for dignity.
As someone who does not respect others, he is not well-social-
ized and is not a fully-integrated member of society. Humans
are by nature social beings, and they can flourish only when
they have in fact realized their sociality. A person cannot real-
ize her sociality unless he develops respect for the human dig-
nity of others-all others. Lacking such respect for others'
dignity, he remains outside of, rather than within. The well-
lived life is, among other things, a life as a person with deep
connections to and for others. Such connections cannot be
established unless sincere respect for others' dignity exists.
64 See Lodge, supra note 61.
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IV
CONNECTING HUMAN DIGNITY, HUMAN FLOURISHING,
AND PROPERTY
What does any of this have to do with property? At first
glance, it may appear that ownership of property has little or no
bearing on human dignity or its contribution to a well-lived life.
Upon further reflection, however, it appears that property has a
good deal to do with human dignity and human flourishing.
A. What Can Be Owned
To begin with, if we understand flourishing as I have out-
lined and further understand how respect for dignity is a nec-
essary condition for the good life, then we can glean the
reasons why, both morally and legally, some things simply
should not, cannot be owned, i.e., be the objects of private
ownership. This topic is often discussed under the rubric of
commodification, but that term obscures the connection be-
tween property on the one hand and human dignity and flour-
ishing on the other.
Consider chattel slavery. Under that system human be-
ings are made objects of property ownership. In such a prop-
erty regime, those humans are systemically denied their
opportunity to fulfill their potential for developing as autono-
mous persons. Not only do their owners disrespect their dig-
nity in the most direct and brutal way, but so does every other
person who participates in any way in that intolerable system.
Slavery is an obvious case, but there are other controver-
sial topics that are usually discussed in the discourses of com-
modification or market-inalienability that may more
insightfully be analyzed in terms of dignity and flourishing.65
These topics range widely, from babies to addictive drugs such
as heroin. In such cases what autonomy means and, more
specifically, what respect for another person requires, is not
always clear. On one level, of course, autonomy is a matter of
self-determination, and we must respect another person's
wishes about how she wishes her own life to go. Moreover,
because flourishing is agent-relative, each person is usually in
65 See, e.g., DEBRA SATZ, WHY SOME THINGS SHOULD NOT BE FOR SALE: THE
MORAL LIMrS OF MARKETS (2010); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100
HARV. L. REv. 1849 (1987) (discussing the significance of, and justifications for,
market-inalienability and offering an alternative justification that relates to
human flourishing); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory ofProp-
erty Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 931 (1985) (discussing role that inalienability plays
in the context of private property).
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the best position to determine what the good is for her. At the
same time, this determination is contextual. It is always
judged within a particular set of circumstances, not abstractly
or indefinitely. There may be circumstances in which an indi-
vidual is not well-positioned to evaluate what will make her life
go well for her. Determinations about what makes a person's
life go well require practical reasoning, what Aristotle called
phronesis.6 6 It involves deliberation about available options
and discerning possible consequences of courses of action that
one might take. Practical reasoning is a capability that is culti-
vated, not inherited, and for some people it is underdeveloped.
For others, there may be impediments such as cognitive im-
pairments, addiction, or even poverty that hinder the exercise
of practical wisdom. In circumstances such as these the agent
is not always the best person to evaluate what actions make
her life go best. Under such conditions, autonomy may not
demand that others respect the agent's choice about how to
act. Understood as involving the capacity to exercise practical
wisdom, autonomy may be served by not merely deferring to a
person's wishes. We may in fact best express our respect for
that person by deciding for her. What I most want to stress is
that a libertarian approach of full deference is entirely inade-
quate. It regards as irrelevant what self-determination in-
volves, and as a result it is ignorant of what respect for
autonomy requires.
B. Becoming Property
Not only do dignity and flourishing inform us of limits on
what can be owned, they also shed light on how we should
allow and not allow some things to be rendered as transferable
property. In addressing the topic of limits on how things come,
the focus is on the scope and contents of private agreements.
The case of Henrietta Lacks is instructive here.67 Henrietta
66 Phronesis is usually translated as practical wisdom. Aristotle distin-
guished it from sophia, which is theoretical reason. Practical reason, or wisdom,
is the facility for "deliberating about what to do, looking for and demanding
reasons for and against proposed courses of action, assessing our emotional
responses and altering their strength, investigating why the world appears as it
does, developing theories that explain the facts, arguing that certain theories give
better explanations than others." RICHARD KRAUT, ARISTOTLE 68 (2002).
67 Chris Odinet suggested to me another interesting example. In the
Facebook/Cambridge Analytica scandal, Facebook essentially denied the owner-
ship of people's data-often representing very private and personal aspects about
themselves-by selling it to a company without permission. The data we generate
from when we share our niece's birthday party pictures or post "get well soon"
messages on the pages of friends with cancer still reveals sensitive information
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Lacks 68 was an African American woman whose cancer cells
were (and are) the source of the HeLa cell line. It was the first
cell line to be reproducible indefinitely under certain condi-
tions, and it continues to be a source of important medical
information today. Ms. Lacks was the unwitting source of
these cells, however. They were derived from a tumor biopsied
during treatment for cervical cancer at Johns Hopkins Hospital
in Baltimore, Maryland, the only hospital in the area that
treated black patients at the time.69 The cells were then cul-
tured into what became known as the HeLa cell line. Medical
research had not then developed the practice of informed con-
sent, so no one obtained Ms. Lacks' consent to culture her
cells. And, of course, neither she nor her family was compen-
sated for their extraction or use. This despite the facts that
Henrietta Lacks' cells were used to develop the first polio vac-
cine7 0 and that over 11,000 patents today involve HeLa cells. 7 '
Henrietta Lacks' case is an obvious and particularly egre-
gious example of acquisition of property by means that are a
blatant affront to human dignity. The doctors at Johns Hop-
kins and other researchers who used her cells in their arro-
gance showed absolutely no respect whatsoever for her
autonomy in connection with a decision of great personal inti-
macy. Indeed, they stripped her of that decision entirely. She
had no self-determination in the matter of how her cells would
be used or in the stream of royalties that they generated. It is
difficult to escape the conclusion that this abuse of Henrietta
Lacks' autonomy made her life go worse than it would have had
the doctors and others shown respect for her dignity. True, she
would still have died, but she would have had the ability to
control or at least affect the lives of those close to her, the
surviving family.
about us which can be used to make us vulnerable to manipulation (often without
us even knowing it). Cf. Kevin Granville, Facebook and Cambridge Analytica:
What You Need to Know as Fallout Widens, N.Y. TIMEs (Mar. 19, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/technology/facebook-cambridge-analytica-ex
plained.html [https://perma.cc/M572-9PBQ].
68 Henrietta Lacks (1920-1951) was not her given name. That was Loretta
Pleasant. The reason for the change is unclear. See Denise M. Watson, Cancer
Cells Killed Henrietta Lacks-Then Made Her Immortal, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, May 10,
2010, at 1, 12-14.
69 See REBECCA SKLOOT, THE IMMORTAL LIFE OF HENRIETTA LAcKs 13-15 (2010).
70 See Van Smith, Wonder Woman: The Life, Death, and Life After Death of
Henrietta Lacks, Unwitting Heroine of Modern Medical Science, BALT. CITY PAPER,
Apr. 17, 2002.
71 See Watson, supra note 68.
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C. Defining What Owners Can Do (and What They
Must Do)
1. Restrictive Duties
Among the most contentious property issues are those
concerning how property is used, and here again, dignity is
often at the heart of the matter. Efficient use of resources and
clarity of property rights are highly contentious in such dis-
putes, to be sure, but these concerns do not exhaust what is at
stake. An especially clear example, one very familiar to Ameri-
can property scholars, is State v. Shack.7 2 In that case, two
individuals who worked for government-funded organizations
that provided health and legal services to migrant farmworkers
entered a privately-owned farm to provide assistance to mi-
grant workers who worked and were housed there. Specifi-
cally, one aid worker was there to remove sutures from a
farmworker, and the other, an attorney with a federally funded
legal aid program, was there to discuss a legal problem that
another farmworker had. When the two aid workers entered
the farm, the owner, Tedesco, confronted them and demanded
to know their business. After they disclosed their mission, Ted-
esco told the aid workers that he would allow them onto his
farm for their purposes but only on condition that he was pre-
sent when they met their clients, the farmworkers. The two aid
workers refused to agree to this condition, and Tedesco then
called the police, who removed the aid workers when Tedesco
filed a written complaint charging them with criminal trespass.
At trial, the two aid workers were convicted of criminal
trespass under New Jersey's criminal trespass statute, and
their conviction was sustained on appeal.7 3 The New Jersey
Supreme Court took a different view of the situation.7 4 It re-
versed the lower courts, holding that the two defendants had
not invaded Tedesco's possessory right. Hence, the state tres-
pass statute did not reach their conduct.
The heart of the New Jersey Supreme Court's opinion is its
famous statement, "Property rights serve human values. They
are recognized to that end, and are limited by it."7 5 Property, in
other words, is created to further social ends, or values, and by
the same token, values define the limits of property rights. The
court found it "unthinkable" that the farm owner could be per-
72 277 A.2d 369, 369-75 (N.J. 1971).
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 IdL at 372.
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mitted to isolate migrant workers from persons who were trying
to help them under the auspices of government aid programs.
The court emphasized the predicament of these workers-their
rootless condition and their isolation from the rest of the com-
munity. These workers-Tedesco's employees-were depen-
dent upon help coming to them rather than the other way
around. Hence, the court held that the owner could not ex-
clude representatives from federal, state, or local agencies or
from recognized charitable groups seeking to assist migrant
workers from the premises when seeking out workers living
there.
Dignity was very much involved in the case, in fact on both
sides. That is what makes the case so interesting. It is perhaps
easiest to see dignity involved on the workers' part. Indeed, the
court itself expressly recognized that the workers' dignity was
at stake, saying, "[The needs of the occupants may be so im-
perative and their strength so weak, that the law will deny the
occupants the power to contract away what is deemed essential
to their health, welfare, or dignity." 76 As migrant workers living
on their employer's farm, their autonomy was seriously com-
promised. They lacked the full ability to control the decisions
that affect their daily well-being. This is true for all of us, of
course, but not nearly to the degree that it was for Tedesco's
employees. They were, as the court emphasized, isolated and
cut off from the outside world. The scope of self-determination
shrinks very considerably under such conditions. At a mini-
mum, dignity requires the ability to control access to health
care, and this is exactly what Tedesco's employees were denied.
Now consider the case from the perspective of the farm
owner/employer. He may well have expected that his auton-
omy interest as owner entitled him to exclude whomever he
wished and for whatever reason. As we have seen, however,
autonomy is more complex than the simplistic libertarian pic-
ture of freedom from outside constraint. No one lives in a bub-
ble, and autonomy must be understood from the perspective of
that reality. There is a relational aspect to autonomy. It in-
volves other-regarding conduct that ranges minimally from
treating persons as concrete human beings to affirmatively act-
ing on their behalf in times of need. Tedesco, the farm owner in
the case, was in a position of power over his migrant workers,
controlling not just their employment but their access to the
outside world. In the context of Tedesco's relationships with
76 Id. at 303.
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his employees, his autonomy meant that he was obligated to
take their needs and his position vis-a-vis the provision of
those needs into account.
What would it mean, then, for Tedesco to have acted in a
dignified manner? We are not told of the exact details the inter-
action between Tedesco and the two aid workers. The court's
opinion tells us only that Tedesco confronted them at the en-
trance to his farm, asked what they wanted, and when told,
informed them that he would allow them to talk to the migrant
workers only if he were present. The aid workers said they had
the right to see the workers in private and without Tedesco's
supervision, and Tedesco responded by calling the state police
to remove the aid workers for trespassing on his property.7 7
Tedesco may have believed that he was justified in calling for
their removal because in his view the aid workers did not re-
spect him or, more concretely, his power to control his own
business. From his point of view, this was a matter of asserting
his autonomy as owner. What he asserted, however, was his
liberty, not his autonomy, and there is an important difference
between the two. Had he expressed his autonomy, he would
have attended to the needs of his employees, who were also
tenants on his farm. He would have sought out ways to accom-
modate their needs with whatever legitimate interests he had.
Since he had opened his farm to them, presumptively, those
interests did not include privacy. If his concerns were legal, he
might have asked his personal attorney to meet with the legal
aid worker. By expressing respect for the autonomy of his
workers, he would have acted upon his own dignity.
Dignity, in its relationship to human flourishing, is partic-
ularly prominent in those property disputes that involve hous-
ing. Where and how one resides are matters that bear in the
most intimate way on personal autonomy. Consider another
well-known American trespass case, Jacque v. Steenberg
Homes, Inc.7 8 In this case, a homeowner and his wife, Lois and
Harvey Jacque, sued Steenberg Homes for damages for inten-
tional trespass to their land. Steenberg Homes delivered a mo-
bile home by plowing a path across the Jacques' snow-covered
field despite strenuous protests from the Jacques. Steenberg
Homes' employees might have used a road around the Jacques'
property to deliver the mobile home, although concededly it
would have been difficult to do so because the snow was very
77 Id. at 300-01.
78 563 N.W.2d 154, 154-66 (Wis. 1997).
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deep. In the face of the Jacques' clear objection, Steenberg
Homes went ahead and crossed the Jacques' property.
The question in the case was not whether Steenberg
Homes had trespassed, for clearly it had. Rather, the issue
concerned damages. The jury had awarded the Jacques one
dollar in nominal damages and one hundred thousand dollars
in punitive damages. The issue was whether such punitive
damages could properly be awarded on the basis of only nomi-
nal property damage. The Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled
that in cases of intentional trespass the jury may award puni-
tive damages even though the compensatory damages are nom-
inal only.
Some scholars have criticized the court's decision, believ-
ing that it falls short of what it means for a person to live
freely.7 9 In my view, the decision was correct and the court well
understood what it means to be a fully autonomous person.s0
Punitive damages were justifiable precisely because Steenberg
Homes had so flagrantly disrespected the Jacques' dignity and
undermined their flourishing.
John Makdisi argues that "the purpose of the law is to care
for one's neighbor."8 1 He further contends that there is a differ-
ence between a conception of human flourishing as living freely
in an undirected way and a conception of flourishing as living
freely "for a purpose," as he puts it.8 2 He wants the law to
encourage property owners to act as Good Samaritans and
objects that punitive damages discourage them from doing so.
Turning to the Jacque case, Makdisi is skeptical that any of
the capabilities necessary for the Jacques' flourishing were at
stake. In his view there was no invasion of the "private space"
of their farm. Steenberg Homes had rolled the mobile home
over "a vacant unused field" that was part of the Jacques' 179-
acre farm, causing no damage to the land.8 3 Makdisi asserts
79 See John Makdisi, Uncaring Justice: Why Jacque v. Steenberg Homes Was
Wrongly Decided, 51 J. CATH. L. STuD. 111 (2012).
80 Had the facts of the case been different such that it was virtually impossi-
ble or seriously dangerous for Steenberg Homes' employees to use the road rather
than cut across the Jacques' field, my analysis and conclusion would change.
Eric Freyfogle states Steenberg "tried to get the mobile home down the road," but
he does not indicate why this attempt was aborted and the reason for stopping
seems to me decisive. See Eric T. Freyfogle, The Enclosure ofAmerica 53 (Ill. Pub.
Law and Legal Theory Research Papers Series, Research Paper No. 07-10, October
26, 2007), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractld= 1024846
[https://perma.ce/6KE9-K6S3].
81 Makdisi, supra note 79, at 113.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 123.
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that there was no impingement on the Jacque's health "nor on
their freedom to make deliberate choices."8 4 Nor did Steenberg
Homes threaten the privacy or security of the Jacques' home.
It seems to be Makdisi's view that because the location of
Steenberg Homes' activity was removed from the Jacques'
house and further because the Jacques were not using that
portion of their land at the time (it was winter), the Jacques
acted ungraciously in not giving Steenberg Homes permission
to cut across their property and the law should not encourage
such ungenerous conduct.
Perhaps the Jacques did not act graciously, perhaps not.
The Jacques were not acting out of sheer spite; they had under-
standable reasons for refusing to give Steenberg Homes per-
mission. The court tells us that "[tihe Jacques were sensitive
about allowing others on their land because they had lost prop-
erty valued at over $10,000 to other neighbors in an adverse
possession action" several years earlier.1 5 Of course, had they
given Steenberg Homes permission, there would have been no
risk of adverse possession, but the Jacques were not lawyers
and could not be expected to know the fine points of adverse
possession law. Still, one might ask, were punitive damages
justified where there was no real injury to the owner? This was
not a case of simple trespass. Steenberg Homes' trespass was
intentional; indeed, it was aggravated. Steenberg Homes' em-
ployees testified that when they informed the assistant man-
ager of the Jacques' response, he told them "I don't give a -
what [Mr. Jacque] said, just get the home in there any way you
can."8 6 They further testified that when they told the assistant
manager that they had gone across the Jacques' field, he re-
acted by giggling and laughing.
We might compare Steenberg Homes' trespass with activity
now permitted under Scotland's right to roam statute (Land
Reform (Scotland) Act 2003 (LRSA)). 87 The Act creates "a right
[in any person] to go almost anywhere in Scotland, on most
land and inland water, whether privately owned or public,
without a motorized vehicle, for purposes of recreation, educa-
84 I.
85 Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 157 (Wis. 1997).
86 Id. (alteration in original).
87 Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003, (ASP 2) § 1. For a good discussion of the
statute, see John A. Lovett, Progressive Property in Action: The Land Reform (Scot-
land) Act 2003, 89 NEB. L. REv. 739, 741-43 (2011). For the legal-cultural history
of the statute, see Gregory S. Alexander, The Sporting Life: Democratic Culture and
the Historical Origins of the Scottish Right to Roam, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 321,
324-47 (2016).
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tion, and passage, as long as one acts responsibly."8 8 Sir Paul
McCartney owns a large farm in Scotland.89 Under the LRSA, I
am now entitled to hike across his land without his permission.
Would Steenberg Homes' entry onto the Jacques' land have
been similarly privileged under the Act? The Scottish Outdoor
Access Code 2005 permits access "on any land in which crops
have not been sown or are not growing."9 0 Steenberg Homes'
entry occurred during the winter when snow was on the ground
and presumably the land was lying fallow, but there is another
difference between my hiking across Sir Paul's land and Steen-
berg Homes' actions. Although my access would be strictly for
recreational purposes, Steenberg Homes' activity was commer-
cial in nature. It was delivering a mobile home to a customer
and was trying to save money by taking the shorter route.
Under the Act, rights are given to "cross land . . . for the pur-
poses of carrying on, commercially or for profit, an activity
which the person exercising the right could carry on otherwise
than commercially or for profit."9 1 The National Access Forum
-Scotland elaborates on this somewhat vague language. It
makes clear that the commercial activities that the provision
contemplates are those consistent with the overall thrust of the
Act, namely, commercial activities connected in some way with
recreation. It provides that commercial activities with access
rights are diverse "and include a wide range of guided outdoor
activities, outdoor skills training, tours and other services
which are directly based on active pursuits."92 Among the ex-
amples provided are guided walking and climbing, guided pho-
tography, guided wildlife watching, and commercial dog-
walking. With the exception of dog-walking, all of the activities
88 Lovett, supra note 87, at 741.
89 In 1966, McCartney purchased High Park Farm in Kintyre, a peninsula
located in the southwest on Scotland. There he wrote some of his most famous
songs, including "The Long and Winding Road," "Maybe I'm Amazed," and "The
Mull of Kintyre." See Mike Merritt, Unseen Photos of Paul McCartney's Kintyre
Hideaway, SCOTSMAN (Nov. 3, 2014), https://www.scotsman.com/lfestyle/cul
ture/music/unseen-photos-of-paul-mccartney-s-kintyre-hideaway- 1-3591914
(https: //perma.cc/M942-W34J].
90 Scottish Outdoor Access Code 2005, Pt. 3.35, ScOTrSH NATURAL HERITAGE,
https://www.outdooraccess-scotland.scot/sites/soac/files/docs/scottish-out
dooraccesscode-_part3_exercising-access-rights-responsibly.pdf [https://
perma.cc/DL9S-PVWT] (last visited June 6, 2019).
91 Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003, (ASP 2) § 1(2)(b), 1(c)(3).
92 National Access Forum - Scotland, Commercial Access to the Outdoors in
Scotland: Guidance on Local Management, cl. 5, SCOlTISH NATURAL HERITAGE,
https://www.outdooraccess-scotland.scot/sites/soac/files//docs/commercial-
accesstotheoutdoorsinscotland 
-guidance-on local-management_-_19
march_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/75ER-2S2W1.
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listed are recreational in nature. It appears highly unlikely that
the Act contemplated commercial delivery of large, heavy
equipment or materials. If correct, Steenberg Homes' actions
would have constituted trespass under Scottish law, even with
a right-to-roam statute that substantially dilutes the owner's
right to exclude.
Scottish law recognizes that dignity involves the potential
for autonomy and that respect for a person's dignity requires
enabling development of that person's capacity for self-author-
ship. As I have stressed, autonomy is not strictly self-regard-
ing. Rather, it possesses an other-regarding dimension as well,
and these two dimensions are reciprocal. If I am obligated to
regard others as concrete persons and to respect them, so they
are obligated to treat me likewise. As a moral agent with dig-
nity, I am entitled to have others express respect for my dignity
and to express that respect in the way they treat me. This is
precisely what was lacking in Steenberg Homes' conduct.
Steenberg Homes showed the grossest sort of disrespect for the
Jacques' dignity. Its manager instructed its employee, "I don't
give a - what [Mr. Jacque] said, just get the home in there
any way you can."9 3 In an illuminating essay on dignity, Don
Herzog recounts an episode from 1573 England in which a
trespassing lord told a landowner who had repeatedly com-
plained, "Stuffe a turd in your teethe." 94 This, in effect, is what
Steenberg Homes told the Jacques after the Jacques refused to
grant permission to cross. Hardly a display of respect.
Viewed from this perspective, Steenberg Homes' action ap-
pears to be an especially aggravated sort of intentional tres-
pass. Viewed from the perspective of capabilities, the matter
hardly appears any different. No necessity was involved. No
great risk was involved in taking either route to deliver the
mobile home. Taking the longer route would not have
threatened physical injury to any of Steenberg Homes' employ-
ees. None of Steenberg Homes' necessary capabilities were at
stake. From all that appears from the court's opinion, this was
purely a case of saving a few bucks.9 5 If the right to exclude is
93 Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 157 (Wis. 1997).
94 Don Herzog, Aristocratic Dignity?, in WALDRON supra note 21, at 99-100.
95 It is possible, of course, that more was involved in the case. We do not
know why the mobile home was needed on the other end or whether there was a
matter of timing. It could be that necessity of a sort was involved from that
perspective. We also do not know whether delivering the mobile home via the road
involved danger to Steenberg Homes' employees. The case might be different if a
few facts such as these were different.
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to have any substance, Jacque presents a set of facts for giving
it content.
Consider another case which we may contrast with Jacque
to see why, from a dignitarian perspective, Jacque was correctly
decided. This case involves another land invasion but in a
different country, for very different reasons, and posing a differ-
ent legal issue. In Modder East Squatters v. Modderklip
Boerdery (Pty) Ltd.,96 some 400 residents of an established in-
formal settlement near Johannesburg moved onto adjacent
land that they mistakenly thought was owned by the city of
Johannesburg. In fact, the land was a private farm owned by
Modderklip Boerdery Ltd. Within six months, the new settle-
ments included 18,000 people, living in 4,000 shacks.9 7 The
owner sought to evict the occupants, relying on the Prevention
of Illegal Eviction and Unlawful Occupation of Land (PIE) Act. 98
The lower court granted an eviction order, but the occupants
failed to vacate. Meanwhile, the Modder East settlement had
grown to 40,000 inhabitants. 99 An execution writ was issued,
and the sheriff was ordered to execute it. The sheriff insisted
on a large sum of money 00 to cover the estimated cost of em-
ploying a private firm large enough to carry out the eviction and
demolition of the shacks. The owner was unable or unwilling to
pay the sum, especially because it exceeded the estimated
value of the land. Modderklip then filed trespassing charges
against the occupants, some of who were found guilty. The
sheriff, however, failed to take any action, treating the matter
as a civil dispute. Modderklip then sought assistance from
various public bodies. The President referred the matter to the
Department of Land Affairs, which referred the matter to the
Department of Housing, which did not respond. 10 1 In the
meantime, the sheriff had increased the sum required for evic-
tion. Understandably frustrated, the owner once again went to
court and obtained a declaratory order forcing all the relevant
government officials (including the National Police Commis-
sioner) to take all necessary steps to remove the unlawful
occupants.
96 2004 (8) BCLR 821 (SCA) (S. Afr.).
97 Id. at 824 para. 2.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 825 para. 3. The settlement had just one water tap, and the only
facilities were rudimentary pit toilets. Id.
100 R1.8 million, or approximately $151,600 US (as of April 5, 2018). Id. at
para. 4.
101 See id. at 825-26 para. 7.
1024 [Vol. 104:991
2019] PROPERTY, DIGNITY, AND HUMAN FLOURISHING 1025
As it was presented before the Supreme Court of Appeal,
the case was a combined application from the state appealing
the initial eviction order and the enforcement order. The court
denied leave to appeal the eviction order but granted the appeal
from the enforcement order in part. The court then issued a
different enforcement order. 102
At first blush the case appears to present a straightforward
private law matter, i.e., enforcement of an eviction order. In-
deed, that is exactly how both the state agencies and the police
initially viewed the matter. The Supreme Court of Appeal took
a different view of the matter, however, observing that this
perspective "does not reflect an adequate appreciation of the
wider social and political responsibilities [that the Constitu-
tional Court in previous cases] identified in respect of persons
such as the present occupiers."10 3 In the court's view, the case
posed an apparent conflict between two constitutional duties of
the state: its duty to protect Modderklip's ownership rights
under the property clause of the South African Constitution1 0 4
and its duty to provide adequate housing under the Constitu-
tion's housing clause.1 0 5 The court treated the state's failure in
this regard as simultaneously a breach of Modderklip's section
25 property right and the occupants' section 26 housing
right. 106 The basis for that conclusion was section 7(2) of the
Constitution, which provides that the state is under a duty to
"respect, protect, promote and fulfil [sic] the rights in the Bill of
Rights." 0 7 In the court's view, by failing to provide the occu-
pants with alternative housing in accordance with section 26,
the state failed to protect the owner's section 25 property right
as section 7(2) requires. The court stated:
[lIn a material respect the State failed in its constitutional
duty to protect the rights of Modderklip: it did not provide the
occupiers with land which would have enabled Modderklip
(had it been able) to enforce the eviction order. Instead, it
allowed the burden of the occupiers' need for land to fall on
an individual .. . 108
Failure to protect one right, in other words, meant failure to
protect another right. The theory is that the constitutional
duty to protect and promote fundamental rights, derived from a
102 Id. at 826 para. 10.
103 Id. at 828 para. 16.
104 S. AFR. CONST., 1996, s. 25.
105 Id. at s. 26(2).
106 2004 (8) BCLR 821 (SCA) at 841-42 para. 21-22 (S. Afr.).
107 S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2, s. 7(2).
108 2004 (8) BCLR 821 (SCA) at 834 para. 30 (S. Mr.).
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constitutional provision placing such a duty on the state,
places a general duty on states to protect their citizens from all
infringements of their fundamental rights, even if the actions of
other individuals, rather than the state, threaten those rights.
On appeal, the Constitutional Court acknowledged that the
eviction order was correct and that Modderklip was entitled to
it. But the court conditioned that right on the state first provid-
ing alternate housing or land to the squatters. It explicitly
ordered the state to comply with its constitutional obligations
by providing land so that the eviction could proceed (unless, of
course, the state elected to purchase or expropriate the
land). 10 9 The occupants were entitled to remain on Modder-
klip's land until the state provided them with alternative land.
In the meantime, the owner, Modderklip, was entitled to receive
from the state the compensation the Supreme Court of Appeal
had awarded. 10
Both the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional
Court focused on the state's obligations, but the decision impli-
cates the private landowner's obligations as well. It seems
likely that in the long run the state will be compelled, as a
practical matter, to acquire either new land or, more likely, the
land currently occupied. In the meantime, however, the law
would protect Modderklip's constitutional property right
through a liability rule rather than a property rule, i.e., through
damages rather than through eviction, even though the latter
would have restored Modderklip's right to possession."1 In
effect, both courts forced the state to exercise its expropriation
power to acquire at least a temporary interest in Modderklip's
land, something akin to a common law determinable tenancy.
This remedy is clearly less than what Modderklip wanted. Even
if the damages were equal to the fair market value of the occu-
pied portion of its farm, Modderklip was likely to be dissatisfied
with this remedy. The right of exclusive possession of its
farm-its entire farm-is what Modderklip really wanted, but
Modderklip was constitutionally obligated to sacrifice that
entitlement.
Modderklip's sacrifice is no trivial matter. The court forced
Modderklip to continue a relationship with a contingent of
squatters that was the equivalent of a small city's population, a
relationship that doubtless it was eager to terminate. Moreo-
ver, as time goes by, the force of the squatters' claims to remain
109 Id. at 841 para. 43.
110 Id. at 841-42 para. 44.
111 See id. at 841-42 para. 43-44.
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on Modderklip's land permanently will grow even stronger, in-
creasing the pressure on the state to expropriate the land out-
right, albeit with some compensation to Modderklip.
Not only as a matter of human flourishing and dignity, but
from multiple perspectives, Modderklip strongly contrasts with
Jacque. In dignitarian terms the differences between the two
cases illuminate why the Jacques owed no duty to Steenberg
Homes. Modderklip was an appropriate case for Professor
Makdisi's ethic of caring. 1 1 2 First, the occupiers were on Mod-
derklip's land under a mistaken assumption of fact, i.e., that
the land was part of the parcel they already occupied. Unlike
Jacque, this was not a case of intentional trespass. More fun-
damentally, the occupants were people in great need. These
were people living in so-called informal settlements, squatter
settlements created by folks who have no access to decent
housing and typically live on government-owned land following
illegal land invasions.1 1 3 As vulnerable people lacking housing,
they had capability needs that were especially compelling.
They had no meaningful personal security or privacy, and the
deplorable conditions in which they lived jeopardized their
health. They had no access to health care, nor did their chil-
dren have access to education. Their conditions were hardly of
their own making. It is only in the thinnest possible sense of
the word that one could say that they exercised self-determina-
tion. Autonomy in any full sense was absent in their lives. As
human beings, they possessed dignity, but that dignity was not
respected. The repeated evictions they experienced repre-
sented iterated expressions of disrespect for their dignity.
What the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional
Court did was finally to show them the dignitarian respect so
long denied them.
112 See Makdisi, supra note 79, at 115.
113 As the South African Constitutional Court stated in Port Elizabeth Munici-
pality v. Various Occupiers, "The term 'land invasion'. . . must be used with great
caution." 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) at 1280 para. 20 n.22 (S. Afr.). Justice Albie
Sachs explains that the term
[Clan be stretched to cover widely dissimilar cases, [such as] where
a relatively small number of people have erected shacks and lived on
undeveloped land for relatively long periods of time, or the situation
in Grootboom [Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Groot-
boom, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (S. Afr.)] where although a thousand
desperate people occupied a hillside due to be developed for low-cost
housing, no intent to jump the queue was shown and a remedy was
not refused, or . .. [where] there had been a deliberate and premedi-
tated act culminating in the unlawful invasion and occupation of a
large tract of land.
Id.
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What of Modderklip's dignity? One might say that the
courts denied him the self-determination that would have ex-
pressed respect for his dignity. After all, his right to exclude,
unlike that of the Jacques, was not enforced. He wanted the
occupiers removed, and he did not get them removed. A closer
reading of what both courts did, however, suggests that those
courts in fact showed a great deal of respect for his dignity. The
Supreme Court of Appeal attempted to structure a remedy that
took his dignity, as well as that of the occupants', into account.
It stated that under the given circumstances, the only remedy
that was justified were "constitutional damages." The court
said, "No other remedy is apparent. Return of the land is not
feasible."1 4 The South African Constitutional Court expressed
a similarly sympathetic view of Modderklip's position:
I agree with the finding of the Supreme Court of Appeal that
Modderklip cannot be blamed for any delay in instituting
eviction proceedings and for the failure to consummate the
eviction order. As already mentioned, the costs of the eviction
order if implemented by the sheriff far exceed the price at
which the land was offered for sale. I agree also that Modder-
klip's conduct in its pursuit of an effective solution has been
prudent and reasonable in the circumstances.15
The court continued,
The position of Modderklip, as a victim of the unlawful occu-
pation of its property on a massive scale, is aggravated by the
failure to have the eviction order carried out. Its efforts to
extricate itself were frustrated by the ineffectiveness of the
mechanisms provided by the state to resolve this specific
problem because of the sheer magnitude of the invasion and
occupation of Modderklip's property." 6
The problem was not one of Modderklip's making, the court
thought; rather, the onus was on the state to act where it was
impossible for Modderklip to evict the occupiers due to their
sheer number. 117
The discussions of Modderklip's situation by both courts
underscore a fundamental point about autonomy and self-de-
termination. Because the context in which capabilities develop
is always social and interdependent, autonomy and self-deter-
mination are relational, not purely individualistic or indepen-
114 2004 (8) BCLR 821 (SCA) at 841 para. 43 (S. Afr.) (footnote omitted).
115 President of the Republic of S. Afr. v. Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 (5)
SA 3 (CC) para. 38 (S. Mr.).
116 Id. at 25-26 para. 44.
117 Id. at 27 para. 48.
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dent. The relational nature of autonomy and self-
determination has several important consequences that the
Modderklip case illustrates.11 8 First, perhaps most obviously,
self-determination is contingent, not absolute. I do not and
cannot control everything and everyone around me. I do not
even have complete control over my own body. What I can
control is how I think about situations and how I react to them.
I can determine how I will act in particular situations and what
I will do over the course of my life, given certain constraints.
The relationality of autonomy and self-determination also
means that my autonomy inevitably and always will bump up
against someone else's autonomy. Constraints exist, and ad-
justments must be made. In Modderklip, both the Supreme
Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court struggled to ac-
commodate the autonomy interests of both the owner and the
occupiers. That was an especially difficult task because the
party who really held the key to resolving the housing problem
was a third party over whose purse neither court had true
power. The remedy that both courts fashioned was the best
that they could achieve to recognize the autonomy interests of
both the owner and the occupiers.
Related to the point just made, within its inherently rela-
tional context, self-determination is reciprocal. Because we
live in a world with others rather than our own individual
world, we must accommodate others and they us. This is an
aspect of the respect we owe to others' dignity, and they to
ours, discussed earlier. This reciprocal respect for each other's
dignity requires that each of us recognize and treat each other
as self-determining persons. The reciprocal character of self-
determination places constraints on what we are entitled to do
with and in our lives. I am not entitled to shape my life in a way
that unduly interferes with how you wish to conduct your life.
As a self-determining moral agent, I am obligated to respect
your status as a self-determining agent, and you, mine. Each
of us must take each other and treat each other as concrete
human beings equally worthy of respect from each other. As
we have seen, especially in State v. Shack, this obligation
places intrinsic constraints of the exclusionary rights of prop-
erty owners, but as the Jacque case illustrated, the same re-
118 Hanoch Dagan has a sophisticated discussion of "relational justice" as
what he calls "reciprocal respect for self-determination" in his forthcoming book.
See Hanoch Dagan, A Liberal Theory of Property ii (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author). It is similar in many respects to what I am saying here, particu-
larly about the reciprocal nature of self-determination.
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quirement of reciprocal respect for self-determination places
limits on these constraints.1 1 9
2. Affirmative Duties
The property duties that I have identified as aspects of
respect for dignity thus far have all been restrictive or negative
in character. They are limits on what an owner may do with
her property. Traditionally, property law and the law of obliga-
tions more generally draw a clear line between restrictive and
affirmative obligations, although the distinction between the
two is slippery. As Hanoch Dagan explains,
Private law, like law more generally, is rightly cautious about
affirmative interpersonal duties to aid others, in part because
they may excessively interfere with people's autonomy (also
because imposing an obligation to rescue may dilute the ethi-
cal value of altruism, while pragmatically, it may be difficult
to draw lines between easy and hard cases). Placing limits
through a negative duty on a person's courses of action is
typically less intrusive on that person's autonomy than dic-
tating - through an affirmative duty - what that course of
action should be. 120
Dagan goes on to point out that property law does and
should recognize some affirmative obligations that owners
must bear. He mentions, for example, the duty to disclose in
real estate law. 1 2 1 Just as the old regime of caveat emptor
should be abandoned, so should the traditional regime of ca-
veat lessee in favor of an implied warranty of habitability. Re-
spect for another person's dignity illuminates reasons for-and
limits of-these obligations.
D. The Warranty of Habitability
Consider the landlord's obligation under the warranty of
habitability. In all but a small number of American states,
such a warranty, either implied or statutorily mandated, exists
119 My discussion of these cases may be taken by some readers to indicate that
I am suggesting that courts should conduct a dignity analysis for each case given
its particular circumstances, leaving me open to the kind of critique made by
Henry Smith to previous work of mine. See Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The
Indirect Relation between Ends and Means in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL
L. REv. 959, 982-89 (2009). That is not my intent. My purpose, rather, was to use
these cases as examples for the refinement of categories. In no way do I advocate
purely ad hoc decision making.
120 Dagan, supra note 118, at ms. p. 144 (footnote omitted).
121 See id. at 145.
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in all residential leases.1 2 2 The exact standards of the warranty
vary from state to state but the gist is that the landlord is
obligated to deliver and to maintain throughout the duration of
the tenancy premises that are safe, clean, and generally fit for
human habitation.1 2 3 Reversing the common law default rule,
the warranty requires that landlords make repairs, at least
those that are necessary to make and keep the premises habit-
able. The most arresting feature of this warranty is that it is a
mandatory rather than a default rule, meaning that the parties
are not free to contract around it.
The warranty itself does not seem unduly disrespectful of
either the landlord's or the tenant's dignity. All that the war-
ranty does is to presumptively shift the assignment of the duty
to repair from tenant to landlord, and that can be justified
consistently with dignity by pointing to the two parties' relative
advantages and disadvantages of information. More difficult to
justify in terms of the parties' dignity is the warranty's non-
waivability. Insofar as we understand dignity as potential for
autonomy, mandatory terms appear to result in dignitary
losses to both parties. There are two points to make here.
First, the dignity concerns of more than two parties are at stake
here. Not only are the landlord and tenant affected by the
conditions of rental housing, but so are, at least potentially,
third parties, including the tenant's children, neighbors, and
guests. The tenant may be perfectly willing to assume the risks
of living in slum conditions in exchange for a lower price, but
others may not. The tenant's children are hostages to choices
made by their parent, and choosing to live in unsafe conditions
in exchange for a reduced rent is no sign of respect for the
children's autonomy.
Second, even if we focus on the dignity interests of the two
parties alone, an uneasy case can still be made for non-
waivability on the basis of dignity. In many, perhaps most,
situations in which a tenant chooses to live in unsafe condi-
tions in exchange for a lower rent, a degree of desperation
exists. The tenant typically is poor, underprivileged, and in
122 See Donald E. Campbell, Forty (Plus) Years After the Revolution Observa-
tions on the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 793,
805 (2013); Jonathan M. Purver, Annotation, Modem Status of Rules as to Exis-
tence of Implied Warranty of Habitability or Fitness for Use of Leased Premises, 40
A.L.R.3d 646 § 5a (2018).
123 See, e.g., Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 208 (Vt. 1984) (holding that an
implied warranty of habitability exists in an oral or written lease for residential
premises which obligates the landlord to maintain a residence that is safe, clean,
and fit for human habitation).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
need of the cheapest housing she can possibly get. Safety and
health in exchange for a lower price is a deal she is willing to
make. Has the landlord unreasonably taken advantage of the
tenant in these circumstances? More to the point, has the
landlord failed to respect the tenant's dignity by making a deal
that jeopardizes the tenant's physical and possibly mental well-
being? A breezy answer is no because the landlord has taken
the tenant's expression of her own autonomy at face value. But
that response is certainly too quick. We can imagine situations
in which we do not and should not take other people's ex-
pressed preferences at face value. I come upon a person lying
on the sidewalk who appears to have just suffered a heart
attack, and I offer to call to emergency assistance. The person
waves me off, saying he is okay, feeling better, and can take
care of himself. If I call the ambulance despite his assertions,
have I failed to show respect for his dignity by not deferring to
his autonomy? I have not deferred to his liberty, but autonomy
is not liberty. It is self-authorship, but self-authorship itself is
developed through the exercise of practical reasoning. It is
tempting to think of practical reason in maximizing terms,
such as in decision theory, but such a conception can be very
misleading. There are reasons to question the assumption that
it is always irrational not to take the action that would be
optimal, relative to one's preferences.1 2 4  Entirely rational
agents sometimes content themselves with states that are
"good enough" from the perspective of their subjective utility,
even though they are aware of the availability of other, better
alternatives. 1 2 5 Revealed preferences are not always the prod-
uct of practical reasoning. Well-known cognitive miscues such
as heuristics and biases not infrequently result in expressed
preferences that would not otherwise be the result of a deliber-
ative form of practical reasoning.
In the case of the tenant who is stuck between a rock and a
hard place, we might imagine that if the tenant's budget con-
straints were removed, she would not accept the same prem-
ises. She accepted the unsafe apartment for the simple
reasons that she cannot afford a more suitable alternative and
cannot afford to pay for repairs. The non-waivable warranty
reflects a judgment, both empirical and normative, that as be-
124 See R. Jay Wallace, Practical Reason, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSO-
PHY, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/practical-reason/ [https://perma.ce/
X26H-SVG4] (last visited on May 1, 2018).
125 See MICHAEL SLOTE, BEYOND OMnMIZING: A STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 21-22
(1989).
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tween landlords and tenants, landlords in residential leases are
usually better suited to bear the cost of making the repairs
necessary to bringing the conditions up to the required level.1 2 6
It attempts to place the tenant in the situation she would
choose if she were under no such budget constraint. In that
sense, the non-waivable warranty can be reconciled with the
tenant's dignity and self-authorship.
The case just made is uneasy for several reasons. First, it
is not at all clear that the cost of maintaining clean and habita-
ble premises will remain on landlords. Unless some sort of rent
control regime is in place, landlords may be able to pass at
least some of their costs on to tenants in the form of higher
rents, squeezing out exactly the class of tenants whom the non-
waivable warranty aimed to benefit in the first place.1 2 7 Sec-
ond and more fundamentally, the argument flirts with pater-
nalism.1 2 8 It seems to assume that a tenant who is stuck
between a rock and a hard place, acting under severe budget
constraints, cannot nevertheless make an informed and ra-
tional choice regarding what is in her best interest. That as-
sumption flies in the face of self-authorship and gives the back
of the hand to the tenant's dignity.
Despite these concerns, the obligation imposed under the
non-waivable warranty is justified. Mandatory terms, although
not numerous, exist throughout the law regulating private
transactions, and they generally represent the collective judg-
ment that certain matters that constitute the core of the legal
definition of the type of legal arrangement involved are beyond
126 Whether landlords will pass the cost of the required repairs onto tenants in
the form of higher rents is debated in the literature. For some examples, see, for
example, RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 645-48 (8th ed. 2011) and
Duncan Kennedy, The Effect of the Warranty of Habitability on Low Income Hous-
ing: "Milking" and Class Violence, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 485, 489-92 (1987)
(arguing that selective enforcement of a warranty of habitability may decrease rent
levels for low income tenants). For some recent empirical studies, see Michael A.
Brower, The "Backlash" of the Implied Warranty of Habitability: Theory vs. Analy-
sis, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 849, 867-89 (2011) (finding a statistically significant rela-
tionship between the existence of an implied warranty of habitability and
increased rent rates) and David A. Super, The Rise and Fall of the Implied War-
ranty of Habitability, 99 CALIF. L. REv. 389, 434-39 (2011) (finding that landlords
won the overwhelming majority of nonpayment cases, even where housing condi-
tions were bad).
127 See supra text accompanying note 126.
128 Duncan Kennedy, in fact, contends that the warranty is based on paternal-
ism, but he defends it on those grounds. See Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and
Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory
Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REv. 563, 638-49 (1982).
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private volition. 1 2 9 Transactions that cross these legal bounda-
ries are commonly said to violate public policy. In trust law, for
example, a private trust that "imposes manifestly value-impair-
ing restrictions on the use or disposition of the trust prop-
erty"13 0 is not enforced because it violates the mandatory rule
that a trust must benefit the beneficiaries rather serve some
whimsical or capricious preference of the donor.13 1 The non-
waivable warranty of habitability is such a term. It expresses
the view that agreements in which one party stands in a posi-
tion of high vulnerability to the other due to lack of meaningful
alternatives constitute an abuse of the parties' relationship and
are outside the legitimate scope of private ordering. Usurious
contracts are a clear example of such arrangements. Residen-
tial tenants who accept rental spaces in deplorable conditions
can be assumed usually to be in highly vulnerable positions in
relation to landlords. The warranty makes such agreements
legally unenforceable less as an exercise in paternalism but
rather as an expression of the boundaries of the landlord-ten-
ant relationship as a matter of law.
E. The Duty to Disclose
Another example of non-waivable obligation that property
law imposes on owners is the duty of sellers to disclose. In the
United States the regime of caveat emptor is rapidly eroding.
An increasing majority of states places on sellers the duty to
disclose all known defects, equating nondisclosure with fraud
or misrepresentation. 1 3 2 To be actionable, the defects must be
material, but the test for materiality sometimes is finely
grained. In New York, for example, a court famously held that
the seller must disclose that the house was reputed to have
been haunted by poltergeists. 1 3 3
The modern duty to disclose is explainable in terms of in-
formation costs. In the large majority of vendor-purchaser
transactions today, the seller has greater access to all relevant
information than the purchaser does, and the duty to disclose
simply shifts to the seller the burden of coming forth with that
information. The parties are free to reverse the shift by in-
129 See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1203, 1248-49 (2003).
130 See John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1105, 1109 (2004).
131 See id.
132 See JESSE DUKEMINIER, JAMES E. KRIER, GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, ICHAEL H.
SCHILL & LIOR JACOB STRAHILEVITZ, PROPERTY 588 (8th ed. 2014).
133 See Stambovsky v. Ackley, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672, 677 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
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serting an "as is" clause in the sales agreement. These clauses
are generally enforceable if the defect is reasonably discovera-
ble and there is no fraud.1 3 4
This is another example of an affirmative duty that does
not unduly intrude on the owner's autonomy or offend his dig-
nity. For one thing, the owner may avoid the duty by inserting
an "as is" clause. More to the point, the duty to disclose makes
no serious incursion on the owner's access to self-authorship.
It merely causes him to fully ventilate all facts relevant to the
transactions, a duty that is entirely in keeping with the spirit of
purchase-and-sale agreement. Moreover, by disclosing rele-
vant defects, the owner expresses respect for the purchaser's
dignity. Recall that autonomy is not strictly self-regarding and
that it has an other-regarding aspect. This means that dignity
is reciprocal. I am entitled that you should respect my dignity,
but by the same token I am obligated to respect your dignity. I
express my respect for your dignity by respecting your potential
for developing autonomy. An owner-vendor expresses respect
for the purchaser's dignity by treating the purchaser as an
equal, autonomous agent. Concretely, this means disclosing
the same information that he would expect to have disclosed to
him if the tables were reversed. By treating the purchaser this
way, the owner-vendor expresses respect for his own dignity. ' 3 5
V
HOMELESSNESS, DIGNITY, AND FLOURISHING
In a widely, and justly, celebrated article written a number
of years ago, Jeremy Waldron argued that homelessness vio-
lates the affected person's negative liberty.13 6 Without denying
Waldron's claim, I want to suggest that it also violates the
homeless person's dignity, as I have defined it here. In this
final Part, I want to discuss homelessness for three reasons.
First, I hope to make the connection between dignity and prop-
134 See DUKEMIMER ET AL., supra note 132, at 592.
135 Other examples could be added, such as the nonwaivability of anti-self-
help statutes for foreclosure in certain states (see, for example, Jordan v. Nation-
star Mortgage, LLC, 374 P.3d 1195, 1202-04 (Wash. 2016) (en banc) (holding that
entry provisions which allowed the lender to take control of property after default
violated state law prohibiting lenders from taking control of property until foreclo-
sure) and under master-servant liability in collateral repossession under the UCC
(see Rand v. Porsche Fin. Servs., 167 P.3d 111, 119-21 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007)
(holding that the lessor of an automobile had a nondelegable duty to repossess the
leased automobile only if it could do so without breaching the peace) and U.C.C.
§ 9-609).
136 See Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L.
REv. 295, 304 (1991).
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erty more concrete. The earlier discussion of dignity had been
rather abstract, and I wish to show some of its implications.
Second, this Part extends my earlier comments regarding the
importance of adequate housing for the ability of a person to
flourish by taking that discussion in the direction of the most
pressing housing crisis facing the country today. Finally, this
Part indicates some limits of what law, including private law, is
able to do.
The previous discussion of the Modderklip case under-
scored the importance of adequate shelter to a flourishing
life.1 3 7 It also suggested how dignity connects with adequate
housing. In Modderklip, the occupiers of Modderklip's land
were vulnerable people whose capability needs were especially
compelling. As human beings, they possessed dignity, but that
dignity was not respected. The repeated evictions they exper-
ienced represented iterated expressions of disrespect for their
dignity.
This same experience has been repeated throughout the
world over the past few decades as the problem of homeless-
ness continues to plague both developed and underdeveloped
countries. In countries like South Africa, the conflict between
homelessness and dignity takes on a special dimension be-
cause those countries have made housing a matter of an af-
firmative constitutional right. 13 8 In South Africa, the
Constitutional Court has interpreted that right as imposing on
the government a duty to take reasonable legislative and other
measures to achieve the progressive realization of the housing
right within available resources. 13 9 The term "progressive real-
ization" meant that the constitutional right to housing could
not be realized immediately. At the same time, section 26 im-
posed on the state a duty to take measures calculated to attain
the goal expeditiously and effectively, albeit within the state's
budget constraints.
No such obligation apparently exists in Hungary despite
that country's housing provision in its Basic Law. 14 0 Although
it is difficult to say exactly how many people are homeless in
137 See 2004 (8) BCLR 821 (SCA) at 828 para. 16 (S. Mr.) (explaining that the
intolerable living conditions that people are enduring are repugnant to human
dignity).
138 See S. AFR. CONST., 1996 art. 26(2).
139 Government of the Republic of S. Aft. v. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (S.
Afr.).
140 See MAGYARORSZAG ALAFTORVENYE [THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY],
ALAPTORVENY art. XXII ("Hungary shall strive to ensure decent housing conditions
and access to public services for everyone.")
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Hungary today, the number of "effectively homeless people," or
those who live on the street or in shelters, is at least 30,000
and roughly 100,000 experience homelessness every year.1 4 1
Hungary has no comprehensive national housing strategy and
social housing policies are extremely limited.1 4 2 If anything, its
apparent strategy has been in the opposite direction. In 2010
the Hungarian Parliament enacted a statute allowing local mu-
nicipalities to ban the "inadequate use" of public spaces. Tak-
ing advantage of this provision, the Budapest City Council
adopted a decree which prohibited the use of public spaces for
"habitual residence" and the storage of belongings for this pur-
pose.1 43 In 2012, the city enacted a new measure making it a
crime for someone to use public space in a way that is "different
from its original designation"-for habitual residence or for the
storage of personal property used for habitual residence. The
initial sanction is a fine, but non-payment results in incarcera-
tion.14 4 The act also allowed imposition of an on-the-spot fine:
if a person admitted to committing the petty offense on the
premises, she was denied any further legal remedy.14 5
In November 2012, the Hungarian Constitutional Court
struck down this provision of the Budapest criminal statute as
well as the section of the national statute which authorized
attaching criminal sanctions to "flagrantly anti-communal be-
haviour."' 4 6 It held that criminalizing the status of homeless-
ness is unconstitutional because it violates human dignity,
protected under the Hungarian Fundamental Law. The Court
stated,
[NJor the removal of homeless persons from public premises,
nor urging them to draw on social maintenance may not be
considered such a legitimate, constitutional aim which would
substantiate that the living of homeless persons on public
premises is declared a petty offence. Homelessness is a social
problem, which shall be dealt with by the state with the
means of social administration and social maintenance in-
stead of punishment. It is incompatible with the protection of
human dignity as enshrined in Article II of the Fundamental
141 See Rita Bence and lva Tessza Udvarhelyi, The Growing Criminalization of
Homelessness in Hungary - A Brief Overview, 7 EUR. J. HOMELESSNESS 133, 136
(2013), http://www.feantsaresearch.org/download/rb-andtureview745601004
7088321940.pdf [https://perma.cc/FZA3-Q9ST].
142 See id. at 136.
143 See id. at 137.
144 See id. at 138.
145 See id.
146 Az Alkotrnaanyir6sag (AB) [Constitutional Court of Hungary] Nov. 12, 2012
Decision 38/2012 (XI. 14.) (Hung.).
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Law to declare [homeless persons] dangerous to the society
and punish [them]. 1 4 7
Following this decision, an amendment of the Fundamen-
tal Law, effective April 2013, repudiated the Constitutional
Court's view. It inserted into the Fundamental Law the follow-
ing provision: "An Act of Parliament or local government decree
may outlaw the use of certain public space for habitation in
order to preserve the public order, public safety, public health
and cultural values."1 4 s Hence, despite the fact that the Hun-
garian Fundamental Law recognizes human dignity as a funda-
mental right, it allows local governments to effectively prohibit
street homelessness. It does add that "Hungary shall strive to
provide the conditions for housing with human dignity and to
guarantee access to public services for everyone," 1 4 9 but the
phrase "shall strive" effectively dilutes that provision into an
aspiration. It imposes no obligations on the state of the sort
that the South African government has, even under the Groot-
boom interpretation.1 5 0
The cases of South Africa and Hungary invite us to ask,
what does it mean to express respect for a person's dignity? In
the context of homelessness, in which affected persons lack
capabilities essential to human flourishing, including personal
security, privacy, and autonomy, what measures, concretely,
must be taken to satisfy its legal and moral obligation existing
under a constitutional housing clause? Must the state actually
house the people who desperately need permanent and secure
habitation? Respect for another person's dignity means re-
spect for that person's potential for developing the capability of
autonomy, and such respect requires both non-interference
with the development of self-authorship, self-determination,
and self-reflection and at times positive action to enable such
development, for example, by parents for their children. In the
case of the state there are limits to the positive measures that
the state can reasonably undertake to promote development of
the autonomy of its citizens. This is the problem with positive
socioeconomic constitutional guarantees. A constitution may
guarantee a right to education, for example, as South Africa's
147 Id. at Reasoning [53].
148 Fourth Amendment to The Fundamental Law of Hungary, Article 8(3)
(amending Article XXII(3)), https://1apa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/hungary/
Fourth%20Amendment/o2Oto%20the%20FL%20-Eng%2OCorrected.pdf [https://
perma.cc/H83R-2CBT].
149 Id. at Article 8(1).
150 See supra note 114.
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does,1'1 but such a guarantee is very difficult to realize. It
should come as no surprise that the South African courts have
interpreted its guarantee in strictly material terms-provision
of schools, classrooms, books, and supplies.1 52 Guaranteeing
schools and books is one thing, guaranteeing education in an-
other, especially if we understand education to include devel-
opment of the capability for practical reasoning. Many
American schools fail to develop their students' abilities to read
at grade level, let alone their capacities to think rationally and
reflectively about their future life possibilities and how to make
informed choices among them. Schools can only do so much.
A state does not disrespect its citizens' dignity when it falls
short of educating its students in this deeper but deeply impor-
tant way.
The same limitations on what a state can do and how it
may show its respect for its citizens' dignity apply in the con-
text of housing. The Grootboom decision is defensible for this
reason. When the South African Constitutional Court held
that the government has a duty to take "reasonable legislative
and other measures" to achieve the "progressive realization" of
the housing right "within available resources," it was doing
nothing more than stating a hard reality.15 3 In a country with
seriously limited resources like South Africa, homelessness,
although not intractable, cannot be eliminated easily or
quickly. The number of homeless persons in South Africa is
large, 154 and there are multiple sources of the problem.15 5 In
addition, South Africa faces many other problems which place
151 See S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 36. The section provides, in relevant part:
Everyone has the right -
a. to a basic education, including adult basic education; and
b. to further education, which the state, through reasonable
measures, must make progressively available and accessible.
152 See Madzodzo v. Minister of Basic Educ. 2014 (3) SA 441 (ECM) at 11 para.
20 (S. Afr.); Section 27 v. Minister ofEduc. 2013 (2) SA 40 (GNP) at 13-14 para. 25
(S. Afr.).
153 Government of the Republic of S. Afr. v. Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169
(CC) at para. 21.
154 One recent estimate is 200,000 street homeless persons out of a popula-
tion of 53.5 million. See Candice Rule-Groenewald et al., More Than Just a Roof:
Unpacking Homelessness, HUM. SCI. RES. COUNCIL http://www.hsrc.ac.za/en/re
view/hsrc-review-march-2015/unpacking-homelessness [https://perma.cc/
Y672-C29S) (last visited Feb. 8, 2019). Homelessness is a complex term. Home-
less people may have no shelter, access to a temporary roof, or an informal shack
that is not safe or secure. See id.
155 See Id.; Homelessness in South Africa, CAPE TOWN PROJECT CTR., http://
wp.wpi.edu/capetown/projects/p20 1 5/service-dining-rooms/background/
homelessness-in-south-africa/ [https://perma.cc/3TFJ-HYUS] (last visited Feb.
8, 2019).
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great demands on the public fisc, so the state must establish
difficult priorities for its limited resources. All these considera-
tions suggest that the state fulfills its obligation to express its
respect for the dignity of its homeless citizens when it does the
best it can to provide housing for them, even knowing that an
actual end to homelessness will be long in coming.
How should individuals express their respect for the dig-
nity of homeless persons? For property owners, does such re-
spect involve sharing their resources with members of the
homeless population? More specifically, should the law of
property place on the owners an obligation to contribute in
some way, as property owners, to provide adequate housing to
the many people who currently lack access to it? Despite the
great need of housing for the many Americans who lack it, I
resist the suggestion that the law of property is an appropriate
vehicle for satisfying this acute need. Although property law
does at times have redistributive effects, wealth redistribution
is not its primary function, nor is property law well-suited to
engage in major redistributive projects. Private law has its lim-
its, and a solution to the housing crisis is not within those
boundaries.
There is no single housing crisis within the United States
today. Rather, several housing crises exist, for economically
distressed Americans face different challenges in their strug-
gles to find adequate housing.1 5 6 Homelessness-actual out-
on-the-street homelessness-represents the most extreme of
our housing problems. Other types of impediments also stand
in the way of the ability of millions of people in this country to
enjoy what others take for granted. These include eviction,
access to mortgage lending, and mortgage foreclosure. These
problems overlap to varying extents, but each requires its own
solution or set of solutions.
The problems are systemic in nature and require struc-
tural solutions that courts are not capable of administering.
Courts, using private law principles, can make improvements,
but these improvements are marginal and often are only in-
completely effective. Structural solutions require legislative
and administrative action at all levels of government, federal,
state, and local. They begin with, but only begin with, substan-
tial wealth and income redistribution taking several forms in-
cluding wealth transfer payments, subsidies, tax credits, and
156 Joel Kotkin, America's Emerging Housing Crisis, FORBEs (July 26, 2013,
10:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/joelkotkin/2013/07/26/americas-
emerging-housing-crisis/#7fd6095571b3 [https://perma.cc/Q7LN-27Q2].
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enforcement subsidies. These housing problems defy quick so-
lutions. Even with substantial governments, they are likely to
persist for some time. But they can be alleviated through con-
certed government actions that strive for systemic solutions.
Consider homelessness itself. Homelessness has de-
creased since 2014, both overall and in every counted sub-
population.157 This extends national trends since 2007.158
The greatest decreases have been among veterans (35% de-
crease since 2009), the unsheltered homeless (32% decrease
since 2007), and people who are chronically homeless (31%
since 2007).159
These trends, however, do not reflect an entirely accurate
picture of homelessness in America. Unsurprisingly, larger
and more populous areas of the country, such as New York
City, Chicago, and Los Angeles, see larger numbers of homeless
people, but the objective numbers of homeless people do not
necessarily translate into higher rates. 1 6 0 But rates tell us
much about the trends in homelessness in relation to the size
of and trends in the general population of the nation or in
individual states. 161
Several factors contribute to the economic dimension of
homelessness. For one, recovery from the Great Recession has
been very uneven, with nagging persistency of poverty. In
2014, the national poverty rate was 15.5%.162 This figure was
not appreciably higher than it was the previous year, but it was
significantly higher than it was in 2007, just before the Great
Recession. Although the number of unemployed people has
steadily decreased since 2009, the number of people living in
poverty has steadily increased.1 6 3 The number of poor renter
households paying more than 5% of their income towards
housing increased by 2.1% to total 6.5 million. 16 The increase
is likely due to the fact that while incomes for this group have
remained flat, rents have continued to increase.
Another factor is the cost of housing. Although housing
costs do vary considerably by state, the national picture is one
157 See HOMELESS RESEARCH INST. & NAT'L ALL. TO END HOMELESSNESS, THE STATE
OF HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA 2016, at 3 (2016), https://endhomelessness.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/10/2016-sch.pdf [https://perma.cc/EJ4W-6EVK].
158 See id. at 9.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 See id. at 11.
162 See id. at 37.
163 See id.
164 See id.
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of a lack of affordability. In its 2014 report, the National Low
Income Housing Coalition developed a metric it called the An-
nual Housing Wage-the hourly wage a full-time worker must
earn to afford a decent two-bedroom rental home at the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD's) estimated
Fair Market Rent (FMR) while spending no more than 30% of
income on housing costs.165
Homelessness strongly correlates with mental disor-
ders. 16 6 According to the 2014 Point-In-Time Count, on a given
night in 2014, approximately 20% of the homeless population
had severe mental illness or conditions related to chronic sub-
stance abuse.16 7 The most common mental disorders are alco-
hol and drug dependence.1 6 8
Problems like homelessness elude solutions through pri-
vate law. Homelessness and related housing problems, such
as eviction and mortgage foreclosure, are structural and sys-
temic in nature. They are not matters that can be sorted out
through discrete entitlement recognition or arrangement,
which is the core of property law. Rather, their origins lie in
institutions, social networks, and social norms. They are
deeply entrenched, and they are complex. They defy any single
or simple solution.
Toward the end of his justly celebrated book Evicted,16 9
Matthew Desmond observes that "[a] problem as big as the
affordable-housing crisis calls for a big solution." 7 0
Desmond's most ambitious proposal is a universal housing
voucher. Every family below a specified income level would be
eligible for a housing voucher which they could use to live
165 Housing costs vary significantly from state to state. In 2014, a two-bed-
room apartment in Mississippi would require that a household make $13.67 per
hour in a full-time job, in New Hampshire the household would need to earn
$20.50 an hour. See ALTHEA ARNOLD, SHEILA CROWLEY, ELINA BRAVVE, SARAH BRUN-
DAGE & CHRISTINE BIDDLECOMBE, NAT'L Low INCOME Hous. COAL., OUr OF REACH 2014,
http://nlihc.org/oor/2014 [https://perma.cc/GY7J-T448].
166 See, e.g., Seena Fazel, Vivek Khosla, Helen Doll & John Geddes, The Preva-
lence of Mental Disorders Among the Homeless in Western Countries: Systemic
Review and Meta-Regression Analysis, 5 PLOS MED. 1670 (2008), https://jour
nals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.0050225 [https://
perma.cc/V4LN-6Y4E (finding that homeless people in Western countries have a
higher prevalence of psychotic illnesses and personality disorders than the age-
matched general population).
167 See HOMELESS RESEARCH INST. & NATL ALL. TO END HOMELESSNESS, supra note
157.
168 See Fazel et al., supra note 166.
169 MATIHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY
(2016).
170 Id. at 303.
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anywhere they choose within certain constraints. Premises
would be required to be decent, modest, and fairly priced.
Desmond suggests that program administrators could develop
finely grained analyses to prevent landlords from overcharging
and families from selecting excessively large premises. Fami-
lies would spend no more than 30% of their own income toward
housing, with the voucher picking up the difference.171
Desmond asserts that this program would "change the face of
poverty in this country. Evictions would plummet and become
rare occurrences. Homelessness would almost disappear."1 72
Although a universal housing voucher would surely make
a significant difference in the several housing problems, it over-
states the case to say that as a result homelessness would
almost disappear.173 Homelessness is a complex problem and
has several causes. One of these is these lies on the supply
side, the strong imbalance between demand and supply of de-
cent and affordable housing. We need to know to what extent a
universal housing voucher would stimulate construction of or
conversion to low-income housing. Further, without more,
there is nothing to prevent new affordable housing from being
located in the same undesirable places (i.e., locations distant
from schools, jobs, public transit, and other amenities) as ex-
isting affordable housing options.1 7 4
A further source of homelessness is noneconomic. It is
well-known that many who are now on the streets (or in cars,
etc.) suffer from serious emotional and mental disorders that
contribute to their homeless condition. The 2015 Point-In-
Time HUD Homeless Assessment Report found that 25% of the
homeless (140,000 of the 564,708 people were homeless on a
given night in the United States) were seriously mentally ill at
any given point in time.17 5 Forty-five percent of the homeless
171 See id. at 308.
172 Id.
173 Desmond addresses two further problems with a universal housing
voucher. One is moral hazard. It might create a disincentive for tenants to work.
Desmond acknowledges that some data indicate some support for the claim, but
he points out that other studies have found no effect. He argues, "By and large,
the poor do not want some small life." Id. at 310. A second problem is that
landlords could use the voucher program as an opportunity to increase their
profits by raising rents. Desmond's proposed solution is rent regulation. "Making
a universal housing program as efficient as possible would require regulating
costs," he states. Id. at 311. "Expanding housing vouchers without stabilizing
rent would be asking taxpayers to subsidize landlords' profits." Id.
174 For more on this, see Lisa T. Alexander, Evicted: The Socio-Legal Casefor
the Right to Housing, 126 YALE L.J. F. 431 (2017).
175 E. Fuller Torrey, 250,000 Mentally Ill Are Homeless. 140,000 Seriously
Mentally Ill Are Homeless, MENTAL ILLNESS POL'Y ORG., https: / /mentalillnesspolicy
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had any mental illness.17 6 The problem of inadequate treat-
ment for mental illness must be addressed simultaneously with
problems of supply and inadequate income if we are to truly
eliminate homelessness.
This is not at all to say that the private law of property can
make no contribution to ameliorating homelessness condi-
tions. Timothy Mulvaney and Joseph Singer are surely correct
in stating, "Property law cannot treat the concerns of homeless-
ness as irrelevant."17 7 Wrongful eviction obviously is a matter
very much within the proper limits of property law, and as
Desmond's book vividly depicts, unjustified eviction often leads
to the streets.1 78 Similarly, mortgage law obviously plays a key
role in preventing and remedying unfair and deceptive lending
practices that often are the source of a foreclosure proceeding
that may be a step toward homelessness.17 9 Mulvaney and
Singer discuss nonenforcement of housing codes as a cause of
eviction.18 0 An all-too-frequent pattern, they find, is that local
authorities allow rental buildings to become so dilapidated that
they pose imminent danger to the public, leading to the state to
order the dilapidated building vacated, with the result that the
tenants are displaced.181 As Mulvaney and Singer state,
"Should the persons displaced by the state's approach to code
enforcement not have anywhere else to go, the state has made
them homeless." 182 Some relatively simple procedural reforms
might ameliorate the eviction rate in this subcategory of cases.
For example, Mulvaney and Singer suggest reforming the sum-
mons sent to the tenant so that it includes "instructions on
.org/consequences/homeless-mentally-ill.html [https://perma.cc/6XRT-YX4S]
(last visited Oct. 8, 2018).
176 See MEGHAN HENRY, AZIM SHIvJI, TANYA DE SOUSA & REBECCA COHEN, ABT
Assocs. INC., U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., THE 2015 ANNUAL HOMELESS
ASSESSMENT REPORT (AHAR) TO CONGRESS (2015), https://www.hudexchange.info/
resources/documents/2015-AHAR-Part-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/DNE7-3HEU];
see also Torrey, supra note 175 (stating that 45% of the homeless population in
the United States suffers from a mental illness).
177 Timothy M. Mulvaney & Joseph William Singer, Move Along to Where?
Property in Service of Democracy (A Tribute to Andr6 Van Der Walt), in TRANSFORMA-
TIVE PROPERTY LAW: FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOUR OF AJ VAN DER WALT 6 (G. Muller, R.
Brits, B.V. Slade & J. van Wyk eds., 2018).
178 See DESMOND, supra note 169, at 308 (linking decreased evictions and
decreased homelessness); see, e.g., Miles v. Deutsch Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 186
Cal. Rptr. 3d 625, 635-36 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
179 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 897 N.E.2d 548 (Mass.
2008) (holding that an injunction restricting a lender's ability to foreclose on
certain loans that were presumptively unfair was in the public interest).
180 See Mulvaney and Singer, supra note 177, at 6-13.
81 See id. at 8.
182 1&. at 14.
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what the implied warranty of habitability is and how to assert
it." 8 3 Tenants who could successfully assert the warranty of
habitability as an affirmative defense for nonpayment of rent
often fail to do so because they simply are unaware of the
defense's existence.' 8 4 Reforms that make tenants, especially
poor tenants, aware of their legal rights, may have some miti-
gating effect on homelessness that results from nonenforce-
ment of housing codes and failure to raise to warranty of
habitability defense.
Homelessness denies a person's dignity. If, as I have ar-
gued we should, we understand dignity to mean the potential
to develop as a fully autonomous person, certain basic material
conditions are necessary for the realization of dignity. Among
these conditions is decent shelter. It hardly seems possible for
a person to live a life of self-authorship without some place
where she belongs. Decent housing provides more than bare
shelter. It also secures personal security and privacy, condi-
tions that facilitate reflection and deliberation about choices.
The person who wanders the streets by day, scrounging for
food and spare change, hoping to find a safe post in a doorway
or under a bridge in which to spend the night, is far from being
the author or creator of his own life. Some homeless persons,
those who suffer from mental illness, are incapable of delibera-
tion and do not view themselves as controlling their own ac-
tions. But even those who do not experience such cognitive
impairments spend lives that are controlled by others. Police
tell them where they cannot be; business owners tell them
where they are not welcome; pedestrians signal subtle (some-
times not so subtle) orders to go elsewhere. The problem for
them is that there is no place else to go where they belong. In
this sense their lot is worse than that of prisoners, who at least
belong somewhere. Homeless people simply are not in charge
of their own lives. Having a place where a person belongs is a
precondition for self-authorship. Homeless persons lack that
condition, and they lack full autonomy. Lacking such self-
authorship, they do not experience flourishing lives.
CONCLUSION
Human flourishing and human dignity are not empty
phrases. They have real content, and they matter in real lives.
The facts are that we want to live flourishing lives and we want
183 See id. at 23.
184 See id. at 17.
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to live lives of dignity. We cannot live such lives, however,
unless certain conditions are fulfilled. Among these condi-
tions, flourishing is personal autonomy, understood in the
sense of self-authorship. Autonomy in that sense itself re-
quires certain conditions. Property is among the conditions
intimately connected with self-authorship. A person who lacks
basic forms of property such as food and adequate shelter is
denied self-authorship, without which she cannot experience
whatever form of life she considers fulfilling. The harsh reality
is that many, all too many, people do not live such a life. Those
of us who are fortunate enough to know what it means to live a
fulfilling life should be profoundly disturbed by that reality and
unwilling to accept things as they are.
